President Aguinaldo's only battle during the course of the Philippine-American War turned out to be a tactical victory, but a strategic loss

On January 23, 1899, the Malolos Republic, also known as the First Philippine Republic, was established with Emilio Aguinaldo as President. The fledgling republic was to meet its match on February 4, when the Philippine-American War erupted in the suburbs of Manila. The republic was only 12 days old. After failing to take advantage of the strained supply lines of the Americans in the Filipino counterattack in Caloocan on February 22-24, Aguinaldo's Chief of War Operations Antonio Luna resigned his position. This forced Aguinaldo to assume direct command of the armies of the Philippine Republic. The only battle that Aguinaldo would lead as President of the Malolos Republic was the Battle of Marilao River, one of the most celebrated river crossings in our modern history.

The Americans, aiming to capture the Filipino capital Malolos as soon as possible in hopes to wreck Filipino morale, campaigned northward. After securing Caloocan, the Americans marched to Marilao, which was only some 20 kilometers north of Caloocan. Meanwhile, Malolos is another 20 kilometers north of Marilao.

   With the departure of Antonio Luna from the army, Aguinaldo was to face the Americans at Marilao on March 27, 1899. The American force was composed of the 1st South Dakota Infantry and the 3rd U.S. Artillery, a force amounting to somewhere around 1,000 men. The Filipino force was around 5,000. The battle was rather quick, with the Americans gaining only the upper hand after bombarding the Filipinos with their gunboats menacing the river. The Americans had 14 dead and 65 wounded, while the Filipinos had 90 dead. Meanwhile, Filipino historian Teodoro Agoncillo claims that the Americans incurred 15 dead and 70 wounded.

Click this to read more:

http://history-ph.blogspot.com/2015/03/president-aguinaldos-only-battle.html

Thank you Mr. Al Raposas

The Bonifacio Tragedy in Context

By Tommy Matic IV and Basilio Ibabawan

The things to remember about the Bonifacio arrest/trial/execution are:

1) It never would have happened if Bonifacio had never come to Cavite. In a communication with Santiago Alvarez, Bonifacio said that he "will not remain long in Cavite but would return and harass the enemy from other fronts" and would "not meddle in local politics". He kept neither promise.

2) Magdalo and Magdiwang were both local Caviteño Katipunan Councils (Sanggunian) and were not "factions" much less not "national pro Bonifacio and anti Bonifacio parties". The Magdiwang was led by the Alvarez clan and were never "Bonifacio's faction" - to the contrary, the Alvarez's hoped to use Bonifacio as their pansabong against Aguinaldo. The fact that BOTH Councils decided to unite and form a new Revolutionary Government outside the Katipunan shows that they were more independent-minded and if this constituted "a betrayal of Bonifacio/the Katipunan" then it was not just the Aguinaldo's and their followers that were complicit.

3) A big mistake in the Filipino historical educational system and in thinking of the Bonifacio execution in general is divorcing the event from a) it's motivations and b) it's historical context. Things do not happen in a vacuum but rather are the result of reactions to other actions. Bonifacio's behavior in Cavite went from annoying (alienating the Magdalo who had previous had no quarrel with him, and threatening the unity of the Cavite Revolutionaries), to immature (his actions at the Tejeros Convention, including violent threats and a refusal to abide by his own oath which he, as President of the Convention, had made everyone swear), to seditious (forming a counter revolutionary government at Naik and attempting to to steal the loyalty of two Magdalo generals), to openly counter revolutionary (assaulting a Magdiwang town, Indang, that had refused to provision him). After this, AguiNaldo ordered the arrest of the Bonifacios.


4) Bonifacio's arrest was carried out by troops that were, like all the rest of the Katipunan forces were, tribal/warlord type armies in nature, meaning that their loyalty was mainly and primarily to their direct commander. Loyalty was via patronage, social and personal debt, charisma and maintained via threats, charisma and displays of strength plus most important, battlefield victory. This was not a highly evolved military organization like the modern Philippine military, but rather more like the Game of Thrones feudal armies or a Mafia godfather's gangsters. As such, Aguinaldo had almost no control over the arresting troops and officers unless he had directly supervised them, which he didn't. And there could no "command responsibility" because of the warlord nature of the forces. So while Col.Agapito "Yntong" Bonzon by all accounts behaved deplorably, this cannot be blamed on Aguinaldo.

5) The Arrest, Consejo de Guerra, and Execution were agreed upon by the United Revolutionary Government of both Magdalo and Magdiwang. Both Magdalo and Magdiwang members sat on and agreed upon the verdict of the Consejo de Guerra. Magdiwang never lifted a finger to rescue Bonifacio. The great irony is that the one person who wanted to save Bonifacio's life was Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo, as president could have opposed Noriel and P. Del Pilar but it would have been extremely risky, given the warlord nature of the Revolution armies.

Testimony of Pedro Giron given during Bonifacio's trial

Many historians dismissed the testimony of Pedro Giron during the trial of Andres Bonifacio because they claim it was made under duress or he was pressured or bribed to lie in an effort by the followers of Aguinaldo to put down Andres Bonifacio. But in the light of the “Acta de Tejeros” or Bonifacio's election protest with his demand for all elected officials to vacate their posts and the failed coup d'etat he initiated as documented in "Acta de Naic" or the “Naik Military Agreement”, where it was revealed Bonifacio wanted Aguinaldo killed, two events that these historians similarly pushed aside and ignore, Giron's testimony apparently jibes with the events and therefore deserves a second look. This damaging testimony confirmed the plans of Bonifacio to regain power and assassinate Aguinaldo. Here is the full text of Pedro Giron's testimony lifted from Taylor's PIR, 1:315-316)

“At the barracks of Naic, on this thirtieth day of April of the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety-seven, before the investigating Judge appeared Pedro Giron, unmarried, twenty-seven years old, born in the pueblo of Baliwag, Bulacan, and upon being duly sworn testified as follows:

Q. Do you know that there is a Government ruling over this territory supported by an army? - A. Yes, I do.

Q. Does Andres Bonifacio hold any office within the gift of this Government, and, as such authorized to recruit and keep troops under this command? - A. I do not know that he had any office or authority at all.

Q. What was the number of men and rifles at Andres Bonifacio's disposal? - A. I was in the capacity of a soldier of Andres Bonifacio and cannot tell anything about the number of his men and rifles. I was reluctant in joining him, for I knew that, since the meeting which took place in the town of Tansa for the election of a President and other high officials of the Government, he was entertaining intentions which were not at all favorable to it. One day, the date of which I do not recollect, Andres Bonifacio came to me and said: “let us go away from this place, you had all better come with me, for something unpleasant may happen to him [Aguinaldo] and his followers; simply because he started this revolutionary movement he believes himself to be entitled to hold the leadership of the same.” After some twenty days, more or less, when all the forces from Tansa had already come over to this place, Andres Bonifacio sent for me, and when I arrived to his house, he said to me: “we shall stay here; in spite of Captain Emilio the leadership of this movement belongs to me; I must outrank him or will have him killed.” On that same day he gave me ten pesos in order that I would carry out his wishes of killing Aguinaldo, in case that the latter should not yield to him the leadership of the insurrection, begging me not to disappoint him as he would liberally reward me for my deed. As things were, I thought that something wrong would happen and without the loss of a moment I left him [Bonifacio] and went to Buenavista, within the jurisdiction of Malabon [San Francisco de Malabon] with a party of infantry soldiers from the towns of Silang, Perez Dasmarinas, Malabon, and Tansa. I knew that Andres Bonifacio was recruiting men to resist the troops that were going to be sent by this Government, and I knew also that he had planned to overthrow Aguinaldo's authority, which he said belonged to him; his own soldiers can testify as to the truth of my assertion; I advised him to abandon his position, to which he objected, for, he said, he did not want the people to think that he was afraid of those who were in power.

Q. Were Andres Bonifacio's brothers all acquainted with everything the former was planning? - A. I believe not.

Q. Were there any meetings held at the house of Andres Bonifacio at Limbong, and, if so, who attended, and what was discussed? - A. I knew that they were frequently holding meetings at their house, but as I am a stranger I cannot tell who those attending were or what was discussed in them.

Q. Where did the food of Andres Bonifacio's men came from, and who gave it to them? - A. I cannot tell anything about that.

Q. Have you any further statement to make besides what you have said above? - A. Early on Tuesday morning I was in Limbong when the firing of rifles between Bonifacio brothers and the troops of this Government started. I tried to use my best efforts to quiet them down to no avail, as Ciriaco at the moment emptied his weapon, the bullets of which cause the death of two soldiers of this Government; I shouted that we being born in the same country should not fight each other, but no one would listen to me.

Upon having read the foregoing testimony the witness ratified it by signing his name, to which I, the Secretary, attest with my signature.”

(Signed by: Pedro Giron, Lazaro Makapagal and Pantaleon Garcia)

The myth of Command Responsibility in 1896/1898

by Tommy Matic IV

Command responsibility is only valid within a highly evolved command structure - which NEITHER the Revolutionary Army nor the Army of Liberation had. Both were warlord/tribal armies with self declared "generals" whose loyalties - and with it their soldiers and rifles - might shift from one leader to another. One can read what Santiago Alvarez narrated about the commander named Ritual, who raped the daughter of a subordinate officer and then was murdered by that officer in return, and then Alvarez's complaint about leaders leaving and taking their men and arms with them.

This warlord "Game of Thrones" type army is what was REALLY responsible for both Bonifacio's death and Luna's murder. Aguinaldo could give orders but could not control how those orders were carried out - hence Yntong's excesses during the Bonifacio arrest. Aguinaldo could attempt to pardon Bonifacio but could not go against two powerful warlords Pio Del Pilar and Noriel, who could withdraw their support or worse join with Bonifacio (as they did before at Naik) and split the Revolution. The Isidro Torres vs Gregorio Del Pilar, Mascardo vs Luna, and Buencamino/Janolino vs Luna feuds are further evidence of the tribal/warlord/low evolved/poor command-rank discipline of the army.

The officers were appointed by patronage, by the number of men recruited and/or by showing courage in battle (leadership/merit) but mostly the first two. Most were called "general" just because they recruited so many men to the cause. They did NOT go to any military academy or have any formal military officer training. They cannot be expected to follow/respect military hierarchy and ranks, much less command responsibility.

The problem is that modern Filipinos make assumptions about the governmental structures and military organizations of 1896/1898. Most Filipinos only experience with the military is in ROTC and CAT, so they assume that the Revolutionary forces functioned the same way.

The problem with that assumption is that CAT and ROTC are built on the structure of the Phil Military and American ROTC, both of which have had at least HALF A CENTURY to evolve as institutions. The Phil Revolutionary Army and Army of Liberation had about two-three years (1896-1899) of existence and Luna had about six months to professionalize the army, set up a military academy to train officers properly and establish the proper and necessary supporting organizations - Staff and Administration, Training, Logistics and Ammunition. Staff would have to be trained in Administration, Communications, Map Reading, Tactics, etc. ALL IN SIX MONTHS.

It's no surprise that the Filipinos were not able to make good and proper coordinated assaults on the American positions in and around Manila in Feb 1899. There was no time for evolution and gestation of either the Philippine military nor the Filipino State.

Napoleon and Wellington, Robert E Lee and US Grant, Sir Charles Napier, Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener were able to wage massive campaigns of more than 100,000 men or campaigns that maneuvered coordinated columns dozens or scores of miles apart precisely because they were highly evolved military organizations WITH TRAINED STAFF OFFICERS that could interpret orders, write dispatches and instructions, read maps, coordinate assaults, understood logistics, etc. so they could bring maximum firepower to bear on the precise points that would shatter the resistance of the enemy. The Filipinos, sadly did not reach that level of professionalism mainly because there was no time. As such Filipino victories depended upon the varied training, available weapons/ammunition and leadership of the local commanders rather than on tactics and maneuver, for the most part.

In certain regions, however, the coordination and cooperation of local commanders could have surprisingly effective results. The Ylocos Region saw a HIGHLY successful resistance under Tinio and Abaya. Batangas likewise under Malvar. If the war had been more successful for longer, the Filipinos would have evolved command structures that would have helped them resist better, as all nascent military forces do when under enemy pressure.

TWO ROADS DIVERGED IN HONG KONG 1898...

by Tommy Matic IV

When exiled Revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo arrived in Hong Kong following the truce at Biak na Bato, he did not have to go back. Indeed this is the accusation leveled against him by many of his own countrymen today, that the money he was paid was a "bribe (suhol)" and that he "sold out to the Spaniards". But if that is true, consider this - he went BACK to the Philippines and spent the money on The Revolution in the form of modern rifles, ammunition for those rifles, uniforms, payroll for soldiers and officials, opening a military academy and starting a new Republic. HE WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO DO ANY OF THAT.

Miong did NOT have to go back. He did not have to spend the money on weapons and ammunition and uniforms and payroll for what would most likely be a lost cause. He had enough to live comfortably in Hong Kong or even in Europe. He could have gone to Paris and lived like a millionaire. He could have been the wealthy ex Revolutionary living it up in the Netherlands (AHEM-AHEM) comfortable and safe.

Instead he chose danger, deprivation, three years of fighting, running, hiding, keeping the flame of INDEPENDENCIA alive for a people that were slowly but inevitably conceding defeat to a colonial power far stronger than Spain had ever been. He chose to return and fight the good fight, to keep his honor not his safety, not his family's safety. He and his men sacrificed that the idea of Philippine independence would be WRITTEN IN THEIR BLOOD across the length and breadth of the archipelago wherever native hearts were beating.

The Philippines was not going to go quietly into the night like Puerto Rico or Guam. It would not benevolently assimilate, it would not acquiesce. It would continue to desire freedom and full independence because of what Aguinaldo and his men carved into the depths of the Filipino soul.

The Irony of the Pet Heroes

by Tommy Matic IV

The great irony is ALL their pet heroes - Bonifacio, Luna and Mabini - WERE NOT NICE PEOPLE. Bonifacio was prone to violent threats, was described by a close associate as "algo despota", deposed two previous Supremos (how about THAT issue? Why is Miong considered "jealous" for "deposing" "Pangulo" Bonifacio and Bonifacio gets a free pass for deposing NOT ONE BUT TWO previous Supremos), got those Pinoy elites killed or exiled by blackmailing them, tried to kill Vicente Hernandez, tried to kill Daniel Tirona, tried to commit armed sedition against the united Revolutionary government - anyone can see that he's not a nice guy.

Antonio Luna challenged Rizal to a duel where one of them might die, used slaps, insults to discipline the troops, possibly and almost surely made good on his threats to shoot disobedient soldiers, used a horsewhip to drive off defenseless sick, women, and children from a train, was implicated by Felipe Buencamino in the mysterious death of Buencamino's son Joaquin, and of course had no qualms about betraying the Katipunan, La Liga Filipina and Dr. Jose Rizal to the Spaniards to save his own life.

Mabini was bitter and vindictive first toward Luna and later Aguinaldo in his writings.

Yet of course ALL OF THEM GET WHITEWASHED.

This is not to say that they aren't heroes or deserving of Honour - but with all the epithets thrown at Miong: traydor, makasarili, walang awa, murderer, etc. - these arrogant ungrateful people should realize what kind of people their heroes REALLY were.

The truth is that Filipino people don't want human heroes, they want mythic gods, a simple narrative of heroism and betrayal, something that THEY CAN BLAME FOR THEIR CURRENT SITUATION AND NEVER DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. The tragic thing is that over and above their flaws, Bonifacio, Luna and Mabini did many great things because they had extraordinary vision, courage and intelligence respectively. But when they are mythologized it diminishes them because it tries to ignore their human frailties and minimizes their human struggle.

If these heroes were human and we learn and teach the TRUTH about them then maybe we can learn more about OURSELVES, what is AVOIDABLE, what is ACHIEVABLE and chart a better course for our future.