Thursday, January 31, 2019

Why Blame and Aguinaldo and his men for The San Juan del Monte Debacle ?

Tommy Matic IV, a US-based military researcher observes:

Aguinaldo was only bringing about 30 men including himself to join Bonifacio. They were waiting for General Vicente Fernandez to signal them to join the assault on Manila but the signal was not broadcast. That is no longer Aguinaldo's fault. Furthermore, Bonifacio was leading more than 2,500 men in his group while General Ramon Bernardo was leading some 1,000 men from Makati and Santa Mesa.

What difference do you think 30 Cavitenos will make? It is very clear from ACTUAL reports of the battles of August 29-30, 1896 that Bonifacio and Bernardo failed miserably. Bonifacio's assault on the garrison of the polvorin at San Juan del Monte was driven off by about 30 Spanish artillerymen under Captain Rambaud, armed with the new German-made Mauser bolt-action rifle plus field artillery cannon along with about 100 native Filipino infantrymen armed with the older .43 caliber Remington Rolling-Block rifle.

The Filipinos failed to capture the polvorin or any significant numbers of arms, and despite their overwhelming numbers (2,500+) were stopped by less than 150 men. The same happened to General Bernardo, who was driven away in disarray by Spanish Segundo Cabo Bernard Echaluce y' Jauregui. Bernardo's more than 1,000 Katipuneros were miserably routed by about 100 Spanish troops including cavalry, Guardia Civil Veteranas and infantry from the Manila Garrison.

This is the US Adjutant General's report on the Philippine Revolution based on Manuel Sastron's official history of the "Tagalog Revolt"




and Federico Monteverde's "The Lachambre Division"

According to official Spanish sources, the Manila Garrison in Agosto 1896 has 300 Peninsular (Spanish) artillery - which would be armed with field cannon and the new Mauser rifles (Spanish peninsular troops were armed with Mausers, native conscripts and Guardia Civil were armed with the older single-shot Remington); as well as 400 other European troops, principally Marine Infantry (Spanish Marines - again armed with Mausers) and detachments of sailors from Admiral Patricio Montojo's Philippine Squadron. Along with 2,000 native troops of all kinds ( these would principally be the 70th Regimento Fijo de Infanteria [Indigenas] "Magallanes", the Manila garrison regiment, along with the Guardia Civil Veteranas, the cream of the crop of the Guardia Civil organization including infantry and a small cavalry detachment)

That is what Bonifacio would have to overwhelm.


ANG PAGKAMATAY NG HENERAL ANTONIO LUNA



Ang Pagkamatay ng Heneral Antonio Luna

This paper is the transcription of the original document entitled, “Ang Pagkamatay ng Heneral Luna” by General Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, the First President of the Republic of the Philippines. The manuscript, typewritten with substantial handwritten edits by Gen. Aguinaldo, is now part of a private collection from Felisa Diokno’s estate. Ms. Diokno was the personal secretary of the first President until he passed on. The parts in yellow (bold) are the edits by Gen. Aguinaldo. The document was transcribed by Elizabeth Angsioco in April 2018.







Thursday, January 24, 2019

Museo ni Emilio Aguinaldo February Events In anticipation of the 150th Birth Anniversary of Emilio Aguinaldo on 22 March 2019 and the celebration of the National Arts Month


In anticipation of the 150th Birth Anniversary of Emilio Aguinaldo on 22 March 2019 and the celebration of the National Arts Month, the Museo ni Emilio Aguinaldo presents its line-up of activities for the month of February.

Join us as we celebrate Lolo Miong's 150th Birthday with a month-long activities. For inquiries, you may reach call 046 484 7643 or email museoniemilioaguinaldo@gmail.com.

#Aguinaldo150
#AguinaldoShrine
#MEA2019
#MakeItHistoric


Click image please.

Wednesday, January 23, 2019

Aguinaldo and Quezon

from THE TRUTH ABOUT AGUINALDO AND OTHER HEROES
by Alfredo B. Saulo


Manuel Luis Quezon, 22, a frail, malaria-stricken major in the Filipino revolutionary army, was shown into a room in Malacañang Palace one afternoon in April 1901. His chief, General Tomas Mascardo, had assigned him to see Aguinaldo for a special mission-to find out if it was true, ·as reports reaching the Bataan front claimed, that General Aguinaldo had been captured by the Americans. Although the American officer to whom Aguinaldo had' surrendered, Lt. Miller, confirmed the reports, the young Quezon was nevertheless afforded a chance to personally confirm or deny Aguinaldo's capture.

He was shoved into a waiting military launch that took him from Mariveles, Bataan, to Manila, landing right at the palace steps by the Pasig Riyer. He was then led into the office of the Military Governor-General Arthur MacArthur, to explain his mission. Acting as interpreter was Fred Fisher, who was later to become an associate justice of the Philippine Supreme Court.1

   
 1Manuel L. Quezon, The Good Fight (New York, D. Appleton--Century Company, Inc., 1946).


EMILIO AGUINALDO
He was a prisoner of the Americans in
Malacanang when Quezon delivered a message
from Gen. Mascardo.





MANUEL L QUEZON
He fought and defeated his wartimeboss, Aguinaldo, in the 1935 Commonwealth  Election.




"As I entered the room," recounts Quezon in his autobiography published forty-two years later,I saw General Aguinaldo-the man whom I had considered as the personification. of my beloved country, the man whom I had seen at the height of his glory surrounded by generals and soldiers, statesmen and politicians, the rich and the poor, a prisoner of war .... I felt that the whole world had crumbled and that all my hopes and all my dreams for my country were gone forever!2

            Speaking in Tagalog after a brief silence, Quezon, who had last seen Aguinaldo in Angeles, Pampanga, two years before in June. 1899, shortly after General Antonio Luna was assassinated, finally managed to say almost in a whisper, "Good evening, Mr. President." To which the General replied rather coldly, “Good evening.”3
"I have been sent by General Mascardo,” said Quezon, “to find out whether it is true that you have been captured, and if so to receive your instructions on whether he should continue fighting or surrender.”
"As you can see," Aguinaldo replied, "I am now a prisoner. I have taken the oath of allegiance to the United States and I have no right, directly or indirectly, to advise you to go on fighting.4 On the other hand, if I were to send word to General Mascardo to surrender, he might think that I am acting under duress and he would have the right to disobey me. General Mascardo has to assume the responsibility ·and decide for himself whether he wants to surrender or not. If you see him, give him my best regards and tell him what you have seen-that I am in Malacañang, very well-treated by the Americans but a prisoner just the same.”
It should be added at this point that in the mind of Quezon, a bachelor with the idealism of youth and in his third year in the College of Law of University of Sto. Tomas when the Spanish-American War broke out in April 1898, Aguinaldo was “the personification of my own beloved country.” And when Quezon saw him alone in Malacañang, he “felt that the whole world had crumbled and that all my hopes and all my dreams for my country were gone forever.”
            Tears in his eyes, Quezon left, saying, "God help you; Mr. President.”
American military rule in the Philippines under Arthur MacArthur, father of Douglas MacArthur, who in World War II was to be the "hero of the Battle of the Philippines,”5 ended on March 2, 1901 , following the passage by the United States Congress of the Spooner Amendment to the U.S. Anny Appropriations Act. Pursuant to this, the civil government was inaugurated on July 4, with William Howard Taft, head of the Second Philippine Commission6 and later to be elected President of the United States, as the first American civil governor of the new American colony. In addition to its executive functions, the Commission exercised legislative powers. On September 1, or two months after the civil government was inaugurated, three Filipinos were appointed by U.S. President McKinley to the Philippine Commission; namely, Dr. Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera,




  
2Ibid., p. 78.
3This conversation is reproduced from the Quezon autobiography cited in note 1 · above.
4On June 27, 1899, from his headquarters in Tarlac, Tarlac, Aguinaldo himself had instructed all revolutionary leaders: “Anyone belonging to the [revolutionary] army who may fall into the power of the American Army either as a prisoner or by surrender shall lose his authority in the army of the Revolution from the moment of his capture or surrender." See Taylor, Philippine Insurrection, vol. 5, Exh. 1071, p. 207.
5Quezon, The Good Fight, p. 77. .
6The members of the Taft Commission were Luke E. Wright, Henry C. Ide, Bernard Moses, and Dean C. Worcester, all civilians.



Benito Legarda, and Jose Luzuriiaga. In seven more years, another Filipino-Rafael – Palma-was added to the Commission.7
            On July 4, 1902, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed the “existence of complete peace in the Philippines.” Of course, this was a mere political expedient designed to hasten the country's return to normalcy. Actually, Filipino resistance to the American regime continued in many parts of the country. After Aguinaldo was captured in Palanan, Isabela, on March 23, 1901, and his second-in-command, General Mariano Trias, surrendered on May 13, General Malvar of Batangas continued the fight for independence, assuming the supreme political and military authority of the Philippine Republic as sanctioned by the revolutionary junta in Hong Kong.
            Moreover, after Malvar, his forces greatly reduced by hunger and illness, surrendered on April 16, 1902, Filipino resistance continued under the leadership of Macario Sakay, a former Tondo barber who set up the supreme government of the Tagalog archipelago. The Sakay government had its own constitution, which provided for a Council of Ministers, a House of Representatives; and a Chamber of Justice. Refuting American claims, the Sakay government issued a manifesto on May 6, 1902, denying that'the group were tulisanes (bandits). For four years (1902-1906) Sakay and his followers waged relentless guerrilla warfare against the American colonial regime. Then; through the mediation of Dominador Gomez, a Filipino labor leader-politician, Sakay was induced to surrender in July 1906 with the assurance that he and his followers would not be punished or molested. Of course, the assurance was another piece of American deception-just as Aguinaldo had been deceived by Dewey8 and other American leaders into returning to the Philippines to fight side-by-side with the Americans against their common enemy, the Spaniards, with assurances that America would recognize the independent Philippine government to be set up by the Filipino revolutionists. As it turned out, the United States government not only did not recognize the Philippine independence proclaimed by Aguinaldo on June 12, 1898; it also destroyed the First Philippine Republic by superior military force. Attending a party given in Cavite in his honor, Sakay and his men were treacherously arrested and tried for banditry. Then in September 1907, Sakay was hanged, "protesting to the very end that he was not a brigand but a sincere patriot working for Philippine independence.”9
In Cavite an American army officer, Col. Louis J. van Schaick, was appointed military governor (1905-1907) to check the widespread unrest arising from continued resistance to the Americans. The infamous reconcentration policy originated by Spanish - Governor-General Valeriano Weyler (1888-1891) was revived in the province, causing much suffering to the population. A news story in El Renacimiento (The Rebirth), then edited by Fernando  Ma. Guerrero, reported:

Some 600 to 1,000 residents of Bacoor, Cavite [were] arrested and hauled into an improvised detention cell on suspicion that they were bandits or in cahoots with the revolutionaries. . . . They were herded together in a compound of only 400 square metres, or less than a square metre for each of them, on the ground floor of an old convent which used to be a garage and a stable.10

In its editorials and news reports, Guerrero's El Renacimiento severely criticized the American administration for the reimposition of the barbarous reconcentration policy.



7Zaide, History II, p. 244.
8Quezon, The Good Fight, p. 69.
9Agoncillo and Guerrero, History, p. 286.
10Vicente F. Batranco, “The Rise and Fall of El Renacimiento,” in Souvenir Program on the
Fernando Ma. Guerrero Celebration, May 30, 1973, p. 12.



The equivalent of the term today is "hamleting." In turn, the American-controlled Philippine Constabulary filed libel charges against the paper's publisher, Martin Ocampo, its Spanish editor, Fernando Ma. Guerrero, and its Tagalog editor, Lope K. Santos. Two young lawyers, Rafael Palma, the first editor of the paper, and Juan Sumulong, teamed up to handle their defense. The legal battle took place in the sala of Judge Manuel Araullo. After a protracted litigation, Ocampo, Guerrero, and Santos were acquitted in February 1906. The verdict electrified the nation, and El Renacimiento was hailed as the “guardian of civil liberties and defender of the oppressed.”11              
            Theodore Roosevelt's proclamation announcing· the termination of the Philippine-American War on July 4, 1902, signalled the organization by Filipino nationalists of political parties to counter the activities of the pro-American Partido F. ederalista (Federal Party) organized by leading Filipinos. In October of the same year, Pedro A. Paterno, a former Federalista, organized the Partido Liberal to promote Filipino nationalism and work for self-government. In December, Paterno changed the name of the party to Partido Independista, which openly advocated Philippine independence. Other parties were subsequently organized but were short-lived. Finally, on March 12, 1907; the Partido Nacionalista was born out of the fusion of the Partido Independista Inmediata (Immediate Independence Party) and the Union Nacionalista (Nationalist Union). The leaders of this party were Sergio Osmef1a, Manuel L. Quezon, Rafael Palma, Macario Adriatico, and other political standouts. The Partido Nacionalista was to dominate the Philippine political scene throughout the American regime.
            On July 1, 1902, the United States Congress enacted the Philippine Bill providing, among other things, for the establishment of an elective Philippine Assembly two years after a nationwide census was to be taken and published. It also provided that two Filipino resident commissioners should be sent to Washington, D.C., to represent the Philippines in the United States Congress but without a vote. Published in 1903 in four volumes in both English and Spanish, the census reported a total population of 7,635,426 Filipinos, of whom about 7,000,000 were Christians and the rest Muslims and others. On July 30, 1907, the elections for the First Philippine Assembly were held.
            July 30, 1907, the elections for the First Philippine Assembly were held. Quezon, a native of Baler, Tayabas (now Quezon), was one of the eighty delegates elected to the Assembly. Prior to that, he had been a successful practising lawyer,12 fiscal of Mindoro and later of Tayabas, and finally governor of his own province. In the Philippine Assembly he became the majority floor leader and chairman of the powerful Committee on Appropriations. Quezon left Manila in the summer of 1908 to represent the Philippines in the International Congress of Navigation in CzaristRussia.13 Shortly after he returned to the Philippines in 1909, he was appointed one of two Philippine resident commissioners to the' United States, succeeding Pedro Ocampo.
            On Christmas Eve in 1909, Quezon, 30, arrived in Washington, a complete stranger to the English language. He recognized this as the most serious obstacle to the performance of his duties as a representative of the Filipino people in the United States Congress. He then set himself a crash program to learn that language. He hired a lady tutor but soon found his progress too slow. He then gave up his American teacher and started teaching himself by reading periodicals and books with a Spanish-English dictionary at his elbow. He also attended social functions without any interpreter helping




11Ibid.
12Under a law enacted by the Philippine Commission, anyone who had taken a three-year course in law was entitled to practise law after passing the bar. Quezon was admitted to the bar in April 1903
13Quezon was accompanied on the trip by two secretaries, Teodoro M. Kalaw and F. Theo Rogers. See Zaide, Great Filipinos, pp. 422-432.




him, “punctuating his conversation with precise Spanish words whenever he could not express himself in proper English.”14
            By May 1910, five months after his arrival, this young Philippine resident commissioner to the American capital had acquired enough proficiency in English to deliver his maiden speech on the floor of the U.S House of Representatives. He told his American audience that the Filipinos had received many benefits from the United States, “but despite it all, we still want independence: ... Ask the bird, Sir, who is inclosed in a golden cage if he would prefer his cage and the care of the owner to the freedom of the skies and the allure of the forest.”15

Quezon concluded his speech as follows:

We firmly believe and sincerely trust that the day will soon come when this Congress, composed of the representatives of a God-fearing people, will generously give us the blessings of that freedom which has made you so happy, so prosperous and so great, and which is after all the keynote of the happiness and prosperity of every people.16

The record shows that Quezon delivered quite a number of significant speeches in an outside the halls of the United States Congress. His constant theme was the independence of the Philippines. On July 4, 1911, Quezon said, in a speech at Tammany Hall, the capitol of New York City: “We Filipinos maintain that the American occupation of the Islands [the Philippines] is incompatible with the American Declaration of Independence.”
Then in a speech on May 1, 1912, he told the Americans that the “Filipino people would unhesitatingly prefer to be poor but free rather than be rich but subjects!” Several days later, on May 15, Quezon again rose on the floor of the U.S. Congress to assert that the “Philippines is for the Filipinos.” Similarly, on April 22, 1913, he told the Economic Club of Worcester, Massachusetts, that the “Filipinos have shown that they are capable of governing their country. . . . I know my people as intimately as it is possible for anybody to know them, and I say to you, solemnly and sincerely, that only a Filipino government will suit the Filipinos best”
            Evidently Quezon, who had fought as a young revolutionary officer in the hills of Bataan, was continuing the fight for the freedom of his own country in the halls of the United States Congress. Naturally and inevitably, he spoke to the U.S. House of Representatives on October 2, 1941, on his former commander in chief, General Aguinaldo, who had liberated the Philippines from more than three centuries of subjection under Spain:

Mr. Chairman, I wish to say a few words in behalf of General Aguinaldo. I was at one time an officer in the Philippine Army. . . . For several months I was on the staff of General Aguinaldo, then President of the Philippine Republic and commanding general of the army. . . . I can assert without fear of successful contradiction that he is a man of high character and patriotism. . . .
During the Philippine Revolution against Spain, Aguinaldo was the supreme military chief, with the powers of a dictator . . . . He had the physical power to do with the treasury of the then-independent Philippine government as he pleased. When he was captured by General Funston after having exercised his undisputed


14Carlos Quirino, Quezon: Paladin of Philippine Freedom (Manila, Filipiniana Book Guild, 1971), vol. 18, p. 90.
15Quezon, The Good Fight, p. 117.
16Juan F. Rivera, “Quezon in Action,” a 6-volume compilation of Quezon papers. Ms., vol. 1, p. 87. The speeches quoted in subsequent paragraphs here are from this compilation.



authority for more than two years, Aguinaldo was as poor as when the Philippine-American War started.

            Adding that he wanted to make invidious comparisons, Quezon then asked the Lower Chamber of the U.S. Congress that seemed mesmerized by his oratory:

How many revolutionary chiefs in other parts of the world who have been in the position of General Aguinaldo have done what he did? How many have been willing to go back to their homes as poor as ever after having had in their possession so much money that they could have appropriated without question?  Aguinaldo is not a rich man today. He is a modest farmer. He has not accepted any position from the American government. . . . Why?
           
Quezon then answered his own question:

He wanted to show the world that he fought for his country not because of any desire for personal profit or power but out of patriotism, and that when he could not fight any longer he could go to his home and lead a peaceful and modest-life, the life of a good citizen working on his farm. . . . Thus Aguinaldo has demonstrated that the Filipinos, who [have] known how to fight for their freedom, know likewise how to work in time of peace. I need not say more.

American newsmen covering the U.S. Congress at the time reported that Quezon's historic speech on Aguinaldo was several times interrupted by· applause from both the floor and from the gallery.
Quezon's record as a resident commissioner was a continuous rise from one triumph to another. First he secured the appointment of a colleague, Representative Francis Burton Harrison, a ranking member of the Ways and Means Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives, as governor-general of the Philippines, succeeding William Cameron Forbes. Harrison turned out to be the, best friend of the Filipino people from among the succession of American governors-general of the Philippines. Harrison filipinized the government service. During his administration the number of American personnel in the government shrank from 2,636 in 1913 to 614 in 1921, and that of the Filipinos rose from 6,363 to 13,240. More than any other American executive, it was Harrison who carried out U.S. President Taft's avowed policy of "the Philippines for the Filipinos.”17
But doubtless Quezon's greatest triumph in the United States Congress was the approval of the Jones Law on August 29, 1916. Also known as the Philippine Autonomy Act, this law, authored by William Atkinson Jones, delineated the government functions as those of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The executive power was vested in the American governor-general appointed by the President of the United States, and he was assisted by a cabinet consisting of the secretaries of the various executive departments. The legislative power resided in an elective bicameral legislature consisting of a Senate, which replaced the Philippine Commission, and a House of Representatives. The judicial power was exercised by the Supreme Court, the courts 9f first instance in the provincial capitals and cities, and the justice of the peace courts in the municipalities.
After the Jones law was enacted, Quezon resigned as resident commissioner and returned to the Philippines like a conquering hero in late 1916. Eventually, Quezon became the President of the first Philippine Senate created under the Jones Law and later the leader of the Filipino participation in the American administration of the colony. He became the highest Filipino official in the government, next in power only to the

17Zaide, Philippine History, vol. 2, p. 248.



American governor-general, but, among the Filipinos, definitely greater in prestige and importance than anyone else in the country.
            During the Harrison administration, Quezon got practically all he wanted. Under Legislative Act no. 2803, passed in 1919, the governor-general submitted any executive order, proclamation, or regulation to the proper department secretary for that official’s approval before it was enforced. This was dearly contrary to article 21 of the Jones Law, but Harrison, whose appointment had been recommended by Quezon himself, did not veto it in order to maintain harmony and cooperation during his administration.
            Quezon's strategy, under the pretext of promoting Filipino autonomy under the Jones Law, was “to reduce the governor-general of the Philippines to a mere figurehead because we want a government of Filipinos, by Filipinos, and for Filipinos.”18 Because the .Senate had the authority to pass upon all appointments made by the governor-general, all department secretaries were under the thumb of Quezon, the Senate President. Though it was headed by the governor-general himself, the Council of State, the symbol of executive-legislative harmony, actually looked up to the leadership of Quezon.
            The Filipino-American honeymoon under Harrison came to an end when the U.S. Republican Party under President Warren G. Harding returned to power in 1920, and General Leonard Wood, a war veteran in and former administrator of Cuba, assumed the position of governor-general of the-Philippines on October 5, 1921. An honest and efficient administrator who had no tact and diplomacy, Wood promptly set the tone of his administration by declaring that his policy was to enforce the Jones· Law ta the letter. To the chagrin of Quezon and other Filipino leaders, Wood exercised his full veto power, rejecting a total of 16 bills passed by the legislature in one year against only five bills vetoed by Harrison throughout his term lasting all of eight years.
            The tense executive-legislative relations under Wood exploded in the “Cabinet Crisis of 1923,” caused .by the retirement of an American, Ray Conley, suspended detective in the Manila police department, forcing Secretary of the Interior Jose P. Laurel to resign. At this point Quezon took up Wood's challenge and the Filipino members of both the Cabinet and the Council of State resigned en masse on July 17, 1923.
The Jones Law gave Wood the powers of supervision and control over all the departments, bureaus, and offices of the executive branch of the government. Quezon, on the other hand, maintained that Wood had abused his authority for unduly interfering with the powers of the Secretary of the Interior Laurel and of Mayor Ramon Fernandez of Manila, both of whom had also resigned in ·protest against Canley's reinstatement by Wood. The Filipino leaders, as in the Harrison administration, expected Wood to liberally interpret his own powers in the interest of promoting harmony and cooperation in the government.
            The mass resignation of the Filipino members of the Cabinet and of the Council of State gave Wood no alternative but to appoint military advisers, hence the epithet for it-Cavalry Cabinet. Since he could not depend on the cooperation of the major political parties in the country, Wood began to woo the Veteranos de la Revolucion headed by General Aguinaldo.
            It was at this point that Aguinaldo, who for more than twenty years had stayed aloof from participation in public affairs, broke bread with Wood. As military men, they saw eye to eye vis-a vis politicians whose meddling obstructed ¢e establishment of an honest and efficient public administration. Quezon had previously organized the Supreme National Council, composed of leaders of both the Nacionalista and Democrata parties, for the purpose of directing Philippine policies related to the campaign for independence, Philippine-American relations, and the administration of the country in geheral.19 Fearing

18 Joseph Ralston Hayden, The Philippines (New York, 1945), p. 138.
19Teodoro M. Kalaw, Aide-de-camp to Freedom (Manila, 1965), pp. 203-204.




that the council was just a tool in the hands of Quezon the politician, Aguinaldo’s veterans’ association refused to join it.
            “We are branded as unpatriotic,” said Aguinaldo, “for having merely refused to join them in a controversy with the governor-general. They themselves were on good terms with the chief executive, and nobody censured them for having such friendly relations. Will they now seek our solidarity, and for not having joined them brand us with the stigma of disloyalty?”20
Quezon at this time, of course, was no longer the young idealistic though ailing army major who, on seeing Aguinaldo alone in a room in Malacañang, a prisoner of war, felt that the whole world had crumbled under his feet and that all hopes and dreams of a great future for his country had gone forever. Similarly, Quezon was no longer the starry-eyed resident commissioner in the halls of the United States Congress, a picture of self-confidence and unmatched eloquence, praising Aguinaldo to the skies. That had been a long time before, and much water had gone under the bridge.
Having brought the bacon home from Washington in the form of the Jones Law and having been President of the Philippine Senate since October 1916, the new spokesman of the Filipino people Vice-Speaker Sergio Osmeña of the Philippine Assembly, Quezon now felt he was ready to tangle with his former commander in chief in the revolution. Quezon’s great advantage over Old Man Aguinaldo was that during his six-year stint in Washington he learned a great deal of American politics, both the good and the seamy sides of it, mastering the techniques of disposing of one's opponent, sending him reeling on the floor and being counted out, without knowing how it all came about.
For instance, there is no way to prove that Quezon was behind it, but it is a fact that his followers revived the rumors that Aguinaldo had ordered both the execution of Andres Bonifacio, and the assassination of General Antonio Luna.21 It is difficult to put the blame on Quezon because sometimes sycophants would take the initiative of besmirching the reputation of Aguinaldo in hopes of currying favor from the man (Quezon) who buttered their bread with political patronage.
A native of Imus, Cavite (b. July 27, 1862), General Pantaleon Garcia was one of the few revolutionary officers close to Aguinaldo. He was with Aguinaldo in the seesaw Battle of Pasong Santol, Dasmariñas, Cavite, in March 1897 and was one of two generals to whom Aguinaldo entrusted the defense of Imus, the capital of the Magdalo government. Garcia accompanied Aguinaldo in the long march to Biak-na-Bato after the fall of Maragondon, Cavite, and fought with Aguinaldo in the Battle of Mount Puray, in Montalban, dealing the Spanish forces a crushing defeat. He was also appointed one of the five brigade commanders in the assault on Manila at the start of the Filipino-American War. Before Aguinaldo left Tarlac, Tarlac, in November 1899 to launch a full-scale guerrilla war against the Americans and to begin his long retreat to Palanan, Isabela, he promoted Garcia to commanding general of the Filipino forces in Central Luzon, with the rank of major general.
General Garcia was ·captured by the Americans in Jaen, Nueva Ecija, in May 1900, but was subsequently released. He then served as municipal president of Imus in 1903-1905 and justice of the peace in 1906-1907. Later he was appointed superintendent of the Colonia Agricola (Farm Colony), in Cavite. In 1933 General Garcia issued a startling statement to the effect that before the death of General Luna on June 5, 1899, he (Garcia) had

received a verbal order from General Emilio Aguinaldo that I [should] lead the projected assassination of General Luna, which would be done at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija. It so happened that I was unable to perform that order. After some days had



20Quirino, Quezon: Paladin, p. 181.
21 Ibid.



passed I received the news that General Luna was murdered at Caoanatuan by the soldiers from Kawit. 22

Intensive research, however, has disclosed that when Garcia made the statement in 1933, he was serving as sergeant-at-arms of the Philippine Senate, of which Quezon was, the President, and that the Aguinaldo-Quezon political controversy was at its height with the Commonwealth presidential election barely two years away, well within the time frame of the polls. Evidently, the Garcia statement had political undertones tending to besmirch the image of General Aguinaldo. Quezon having been a man of great foresight, it is quite possible that even then he spared no effort in trying to eliminate a potential rival for the Presidency of the Philippine Commonwealth. Quezon was at the height of his political power before the Commonwealth election, and no man in the opposition except Aguinaldo would have dared run against him. So Aguinaldo had to be trimmed by all means. This seamy side of American politics Quezon learned in his six-year stint at the American capital to insure his own political future.

            American capital to insure his own political future. The same political motivation was behind the reported “funeral reception” accorded Aguinaldo and his followers when they arrived in Malolos, Bulacan, on January 23, 1928, to commemorate the twenty-ninth anniversary of the inauguration of the First Philippine Republic. “Nearly all the houses and stores of the town closed their doors and windows and displayed black flags," says a long-time Aguinaldo detractor; “the church bell rang out the lugubrious plegaria; all business activities were suspended; and placards were posted in different parts of the town with the provocative question, Emilio Aguinaldo. . . who shall answer for the death of the two Filipino patriots, Luna and Bonifacio?”23

            Again, it is hard-perhaps impossible-to prove that Quezon was behind the anti-Aguinaldo reception. But the fact is that the incident happened within the time frame of the Commonwealth presidential polls and with the trauma caused by the Wood Cabinet crisis and the ensuing Aguinaldo-Quezon parting of the ways still fresh and unhealed.  The incident, like the Garcia statement, tended to undermine public faith and confidence in Aguinaldo, a potential Quezon rival in the presidential election not too far ahead.

            It is well to remember that the continuing accusation against Aguinaldo for the deaths of Bonifacio and Luna stemmed from Apolinario Mabini’s scurrilous and malicious allegations in his book La Revolucion Filipina, written with evident rancor during his exile in Guam. That Mabini, a former assistant attorney in the office of the patriot Numeriano Adriano and so-called "Brains of the Revolution,” used hearsay evidence to assassinate the character of Aguinaldo, Mabini’s former benefactor, is not only the height of ingratitude but also a disgrace to the legal profession.
            Another and more subtle way lo downgrade Aguinaldo was to extoll Bonifacio to the skies despite the lack of historical justification for it. It was a Quezon-dominated Philippine Legislature that passed Act no. 2946 on February 16, 1921, making Bonifacio’s birthday anniversary, November 30, the legal holiday that it still is.24 It was also the same legislature that appropriated· the funds which, together with an amount raised through popular subscription, were used to erect the gigantic Bonifacio monument at the Balintawak rotunda in Caloocan City.
            In a speech delivered at Balintawak during the ceremony to lay the cornerstone of the Bonifacio monument on November 30, 1929, the then Senate President Quezon said:


22”Statement of General Pantaleon Garcia," in Jose P. Santos, Si Heneral Emilio Aguinaldo. Ang Nagpapatay Kay Gen. Antonio Luna? (1933). See Vivencio R. Jose, The Rise and Fall of Antonio Luna (Quezon City, University of the Philippines Press, 1971), p. 403.
23Renato Constantino, Insight and Foresight. Selected excerpts annotated by Luis R. Mauricio (Quezon City, Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1979), pp. 20-21.
24”Bonifacio Day Marked Tuesday,” Bulletin Today, November 27, 1982.



“The memory of his [Bonifacio’s] life and deeds will keep the flame of inspiration ever burning in the hearts of generations yet unborn.” Quezon asserted that it was “Bonifacio, Emilio Jacinto, and a handful of brave men [who] launched our people into the battlefield for the vindication of their rights to free them from the yoke of tyranny. It can be truly said, therefore, that Rizal was the creator of Filipino nationality, and Bonifacio the redeemer of our country's liberties.”25
            The undeniable historical fact, however~ is that Bonifacio's Katipunan ignited the revolt-not-revolution-that ended in the Battle of San Juan del Monte, in a place now known as Pinaglabanan, on August 30, 1896. The Katipunan revolt lasted only a week-August 23-30. It pales into insignificance compared with, for instance, the Dagohoy revolt on Bohol island, which lasted all of 85 years (1744-1829).
            The revolution that broke out on the day after the latter was crushed on August 31 was organizationally separate from and independent of the Katipunan revolt. In fact, the Cavite revolutionists rejected the Katipunan and set up a revolutionary government under Aguinaldo to carry on the fight against the Spaniards. To say that Bonifacio was the “Father of the Philippine Revolution” is a historical distortion that serves the then ongoing American colonial policy of downgrading Aguinaldo who led the Filipino forces in the Philippine-American War (1899-1901). Unlike Rizal, Bonifacio, or Mabini, General Aguinaldo was the symbol of Filipino resistance to American colonization and imperialism. Aguinaldo became the bete noire of the Americans because in this war, a total of 4,234 American soldiers were killed in 2,811 recorded encounters, and the Washington government spent all of  ₱600 million – a gargantuan amount in those days-to overcome the Filipino resistance.
            Having kept aloof from Philippine politics since the beginning of the American regime, Aguinaldo at first refused the candidacy for President of the Commonwealth offered him by his admirers at a popular banquet in Manila.26 He saw that he had no organized political machine behind him strong enough to help him to compete with the ruling Partido Nacionalista Consolidado of both Quezon and Osmeña. Moreover, according to his own biographer, Carlos Quirino, to the younger generation of Filipinos who constituted the big bulk of the voting population, Aguinaldo was almost a complete stranger. 27 A few weeks after the banquet, however, Aguinaldo changed his mind and announced ·his acceptance of the "candidature in obedience to the call of the people.“28
            Incidentally, after Aguinaldo announced his candidacy, Gregorio Aglipay, a contemporary of his in the revolution and obispo maximo (supreme bishop) of the Philippine Independent Church, also announced that he was running for the presidency of the Commonwealth.
            The proclamation of Aguinaldo's candidacy was made in Cavite amidst thunderous rejoicing by thousands of “frenzied devotees.” Aguinaldo explained why he had accepted the candidacy, as follows:

            Had I refused, I would have ignored the voice of thousands of my countrymen who are at present in the clutches of hunger and misery and whose laments [cannot] awaken the pity of those who are in power. While [the latter] are enjoying the delights of the feast, they should remember the underdogs to whom not even crumbs are left. If I should refuse to leave the peace of my home, I would [be closing] my



25Manuel L. Quezon, “Andres Bonifacio, the Great Plebeian,” Historical Bulletin (Special Bonifacio Number), September 1963. ·
26Isabelo P. Caballero and M. de Gracia Concepcion, The Story of a Nation and Its Foremost
Statesman (Manila, International Publishers, 1935), p. 417.
27Quirino, Young Aguinaldo, Manila, 1969.
28Caballero and Concepcion, Story of a Nation, p. 417.



eyes to the sufferings of our people whose farms are prostrate, whose trades are unprotected, and whose industries are not given sufficient stimulus for development.
            If I had not acceded to your petition, I would have turned my back to the complaints of thousands of my poor countrymen for whose children there is no sufficient room in the schools where they may learn the most elementary knowledge of a good citizenship; I would have ignored the protests of many government employees who are victims of injustices and prejudices and whose merits are superseded by favoritism and sectionalism. . . .
            Where are the patriots, where are those who have sworn to serve the people's interests? Why are they silent? Why is it that instead of looking into the coin plaints of the people and telling the people of what is going on, there is sepulchral silence in our political world? Is there, within that silence, a plot against the people's welfare? Is it ~cause, in exchange for all the silence and submission, there will be rewards in the form of fat-salaried positions?29

            Aguinaldo ran under the banner of a newly organized political party, the National Socialist Party, headed by his own bilas, Senator Emiliano Tria Tirona” husband of the sister of his wife, Hilaria del Rosario Aguinaldo. Half in jest and half in ridicule, the Quezon biographers, Caballero and Concepcion, called it an “abortive” party. But more appropriately perhaps, the National Socialist Party can be described as an ad hoc political party-one organized for that particular election alone.
            A man known for his prudence and level-headedness, it is doubtful if Aguinaldo ever entertained the thought of victory over his, opponent, the master politician – Quezon. But it is certain that he was a greater lover of democracy as evidenced by the fact that as a “dictator” for one month in Philippine history – May 24 to June 23, 1898 – in a role he reluctantly played at the advice of the Hong Kong Junta-Aguinaldo never used his dictatorial powers and at the first opportunity willingly changed his dictatorial government to a democratic revolutionary govemment.30
            The result of the Commonwealth presidential election of September 17, 1935, was a foregone conclusion. Manuel L. Quezon, the man of the hour, garnered 695,332 votes; Emilio Aguinaldo, his former commander in chief of the Philippine Revolution, 179,349; and Gregorio Aglipay, the man-of-the-cloth-turned-politician, 148,010.31 The combined votes of Aguinaldo and Aglipay were less than half of Quezon's-a telling lesson for the two oldsters of the Philippine Revolution.
            It will be recalled that when Aguinaldo announced his candidacy, Quezon, the politician who had never known defeat, appeared to be running unopposed. The concensus is that to oppose Quezon at that height of his popularity was an exercise in futility. Several times in the past, Quezon had run for senator unopposed in the fifth senatorial district. That certainly was not good for democracy. A multi-party or, at best, a two-party system is necessary for a healthy democracy.
            Thinking that Quezon, the presidential candidate, would again .run unopposed, Aguinaldo decided to throw his hat into the ring. For Aguinaldo, a gentleman farmer, it was a most expensive decision. It cost him about ₱200,000 in campaign funds which he borrowed from his relatives. It was a fabulous amount in those days. Political wiseacres laughed at him; he did not have a ghost of a chance to win. But Aguinaldo, who never completely lost his idealism, was dead right: he ran against Quezon, the sure winner, to keep the fire of democracy burning in the Philippines. A Don Quixote, indeed, but a man of high principles.




29Ibid., 419.
30Taylor, Philippine Insurrection, vol. 3, Exh. 43, pp. 134-141.
31Quirino, Quezon: Paladin; p. 280.






6 years after the Commonwealth Election. Daniel Maramba paved the way for the reconciliation of the statesmen Manuel Quezon and Emilio Aguinaldo but the black propaganda will continue to take its toll on the image of Aguinaldo. Photo courtesy of Alma Kern, granddaughter of Daniel Maramba.







BRIG. GEN. FREDERICK FUNSTON
 Said Aguinaldo was a man of “many excellence qualities.”
MAJ. GEN. ELWELL S. OTIS
Commander of U.S. Eighth Army Corps.

\
ADMIRAL GEORGE DEWEY
He sank the Spanish fleet but lacked a land force to defeat the enemy, hence his invitation to Aguinaldo to come home










GINAHASA BA SI GREGORIA "ORYANG" DE JESUS ?

ni Virgilio Leynes Walang katibayan o salaysay na nagpapatunay na si Gregoria de Jesus (Oryang), ang magandang maybahay ni Supremo Andres Bo...