by Tommy Matic IV
Tarrog's previous 'opus' Heneral Luna is badly
written (the American dialogue is utterly cringeworthy, derivate -
"Unleash hell" ninakaw kay Ridley Scott - and unresearched), badly
staged (many of the scenes are staged like STAGE PLAYS instead of CINEMA,
camera work is pedestrian to poor, editing is average) and worse he panders to
the ignorant anti-First Republic zeitgeist while playing up all these macho
tropes for his 'strongman' hero.
HENERAL LUNA: CINEMATIC FICTION VS HISTORICAL FACT
There are several important considerations to remember when viewing the supposedly historical film "Heneral Luna". The fact that the production team NEVER brings these issues up throws into question their motivations for making this film and makes their claim to accuracy extremely shaky.
THE KAWIT BATTALION - VETERAN HEROES
HENERAL LUNA: CINEMATIC FICTION VS HISTORICAL FACT
There are several important considerations to remember when viewing the supposedly historical film "Heneral Luna". The fact that the production team NEVER brings these issues up throws into question their motivations for making this film and makes their claim to accuracy extremely shaky.
THE KAWIT BATTALION - VETERAN HEROES
The Kawit Battalion as its name implies was composed of men from Kawit - many had taken their families with them and their relationship to Aguinaldo would not have been dissimilar to an old medieval noble and his vassals (As just about ALL the Filipino forces were). Indeed it is these Kawit FAMILIES that would be a sore point between Luna and the Kawit men, something which the historical fantasy revisionist junk movie Heneral Luna NEVER brings out.
The Kawit men were almost certainly veterans of the 1896 Revolution which means these were the heroes who held the bridge at Imus, the trenches of Binakayan, saw Evangelista die at Zapote Bridge and Crispulo fall at Pasong Santol. They were HEROES and without them there might not be a Philippine Rebolution - that fact must be emphasized THROUGHOUT any discussion of the Luna assassination.
The Kawit troops fought in 1896-97. Luna DIDN'T. He was betrayed by Bonifacio and squealed to save his own skin. His squealing helped condemn Dr Jose Rizal and in exchange he got exile in Europe, where he took a year's crash course in military engineering and tactics under the future defender of Liege, General Leman. You might say that Rizal's death paid for Luna's military credentials.
To the Kawit men, Luna might have been seen as a Johnny Come Lately at best, a traitor at worst. That is never brought out by that bullcrap movie.
LUNA THE LITTLE BROWN SPANIARD
Luna by any reasonable estimation was a little brown Spaniard. He befriended by brought in many ex Spanish Colonial Army officers including his own top two guys Paco Roman and Jose Torres Bugallon plus ex Guardia Civil officer Manuel Bernal Sityar who had done so much to CRUSH Bonifacio and the Manila Katipunan in August 1896. His friends were Spanish and Filipino ilustrado and were the EXACT KIND OF ELITIST THAT LEFTISTS AND BONIFASCISTS ACCUSE AGUINALDO OF BEING. If these imbeciles took the time to research they will see that their class struggle myth can only be fulfilled if the struggle was between Bonifacio and Antonio Luna.
If you were a veteran of 1896-97 and saw these Spaniards sudden being given command ranks over you, what would you think??? What about your friends, family killed by the Spaniards at Imus, Binakayan, in the Lachambre offensive?
The fantasy Heneral Luna movie BROWN-WASHES the Spanish connection. They make Luna a brown man's hero speaking Tagalog, instead of the man 1896 veteran commander Tomas Mascardo grew to hate, a HAMBOG who spoke nothing but SPANISH (as witness part of their infamous communique exchange where Luna offers Mascardo a 'translator' and Mascardo responds with the forgotten retort that would make any Filipino nationalist proud - I am comfortable speaking in my native tongue, Tagalog. )
This is never brought out by that bullcrap movie.
LUNA VS THE KAWIT BATTALION - BULLYING, BAGGAGE TRAINS, BLOOD AND SWEAT
Next, Luna was probably a far better medical man than military man - he actually got a degree in medicine compared to a year long crash course in military science. This would have bitter and possibly fatal consequences in his conflict with the Kawit Battalion.
Luna complained to Aguinaldo that the Kawit men would leave their trenches to visit their families in the baggage train. While he is justified by military practice, he totally misreads the Filipino soldiers motivations and tries to bully them into obeying orders. Remember, these are men who have taken their families with them and possibly lost all their property in American occupied Cavite. While his complaint makes perfect military sense, his means of dealing with it was a devastating miscalculation of military psychology.
You CANNOT impose your will on people without more people being willing to back you up particularly within the specific organization you are disciplining, than those who you need to discipline. This only happens if the unit has had enough training, esprit De corps, an established hierarchy that is beholden to you and not to someone else and other traits of a disciplined and long established military unit.
The Kawit Battalion like all other battalions of the Philippine Army of Liberation were essentially feudal armies loyal to their own chiefs and officers. With time and retraining Luna could have professionalized them while Sityar retrained the officer corps. Time was something they just did not have.
Luna instead turned to bullying to achieve discipline. While it undoubtedly got results and in units with a proportion of ex Spanish Colonial Army veterans to, as I stated above, back Luna up it would have highly increased unit capabilities, in the case of the Kawit men they saw themselves - and justifiably so - as Aguinaldo's personal guard and Aguinaldo's personal vassals. They, like other guard units in history, were not answerable to an outsider like Luna. By attempting to bully them into obeying, Luna made them his enemies.
A critical incident that the stupid historically illiterate Heneral Luna movie plays for laughs is the train incident. General Alejandrino narrates the incident in Dr Vivencio Jose's book.
The presidential train with Aguinaldo and Aguinaldo's family aboard was pulling into (IIRC) Malolos station when Luna observed that some of the families of the Kawit Battalion riding on the train were infected with smallpox, a highly virulent and contagious disease. He then took a horse whip and proceeded to "cleanse the temple" and drive out the sick and suffering women and children of Aguinaldo's personal guards, remarking to Alejandrino that Revolutions were not fought with sugarplums and good wishes but with blood and sweat or something to that effect. He did this under the eyes of the Kawit men and of Aguinaldo himself and Aguinaldo's family. It was a personal affront but Luna likely saw himself as pretty secure in his position and friendship with President Aguinaldo that he had no fear in doing this rash deed.
Luna by any reasonable estimation was a little brown Spaniard. He befriended by brought in many ex Spanish Colonial Army officers including his own top two guys Paco Roman and Jose Torres Bugallon plus ex Guardia Civil officer Manuel Bernal Sityar who had done so much to CRUSH Bonifacio and the Manila Katipunan in August 1896. His friends were Spanish and Filipino ilustrado and were the EXACT KIND OF ELITIST THAT LEFTISTS AND BONIFASCISTS ACCUSE AGUINALDO OF BEING. If these imbeciles took the time to research they will see that their class struggle myth can only be fulfilled if the struggle was between Bonifacio and Antonio Luna.
If you were a veteran of 1896-97 and saw these Spaniards sudden being given command ranks over you, what would you think??? What about your friends, family killed by the Spaniards at Imus, Binakayan, in the Lachambre offensive?
The fantasy Heneral Luna movie BROWN-WASHES the Spanish connection. They make Luna a brown man's hero speaking Tagalog, instead of the man 1896 veteran commander Tomas Mascardo grew to hate, a HAMBOG who spoke nothing but SPANISH (as witness part of their infamous communique exchange where Luna offers Mascardo a 'translator' and Mascardo responds with the forgotten retort that would make any Filipino nationalist proud - I am comfortable speaking in my native tongue, Tagalog. )
This is never brought out by that bullcrap movie.
LUNA VS THE KAWIT BATTALION - BULLYING, BAGGAGE TRAINS, BLOOD AND SWEAT
Next, Luna was probably a far better medical man than military man - he actually got a degree in medicine compared to a year long crash course in military science. This would have bitter and possibly fatal consequences in his conflict with the Kawit Battalion.
Luna complained to Aguinaldo that the Kawit men would leave their trenches to visit their families in the baggage train. While he is justified by military practice, he totally misreads the Filipino soldiers motivations and tries to bully them into obeying orders. Remember, these are men who have taken their families with them and possibly lost all their property in American occupied Cavite. While his complaint makes perfect military sense, his means of dealing with it was a devastating miscalculation of military psychology.
You CANNOT impose your will on people without more people being willing to back you up particularly within the specific organization you are disciplining, than those who you need to discipline. This only happens if the unit has had enough training, esprit De corps, an established hierarchy that is beholden to you and not to someone else and other traits of a disciplined and long established military unit.
The Kawit Battalion like all other battalions of the Philippine Army of Liberation were essentially feudal armies loyal to their own chiefs and officers. With time and retraining Luna could have professionalized them while Sityar retrained the officer corps. Time was something they just did not have.
Luna instead turned to bullying to achieve discipline. While it undoubtedly got results and in units with a proportion of ex Spanish Colonial Army veterans to, as I stated above, back Luna up it would have highly increased unit capabilities, in the case of the Kawit men they saw themselves - and justifiably so - as Aguinaldo's personal guard and Aguinaldo's personal vassals. They, like other guard units in history, were not answerable to an outsider like Luna. By attempting to bully them into obeying, Luna made them his enemies.
A critical incident that the stupid historically illiterate Heneral Luna movie plays for laughs is the train incident. General Alejandrino narrates the incident in Dr Vivencio Jose's book.
The presidential train with Aguinaldo and Aguinaldo's family aboard was pulling into (IIRC) Malolos station when Luna observed that some of the families of the Kawit Battalion riding on the train were infected with smallpox, a highly virulent and contagious disease. He then took a horse whip and proceeded to "cleanse the temple" and drive out the sick and suffering women and children of Aguinaldo's personal guards, remarking to Alejandrino that Revolutions were not fought with sugarplums and good wishes but with blood and sweat or something to that effect. He did this under the eyes of the Kawit men and of Aguinaldo himself and Aguinaldo's family. It was a personal affront but Luna likely saw himself as pretty secure in his position and friendship with President Aguinaldo that he had no fear in doing this rash deed.
THE FORGOTTEN BUENCAMINO
Luna counted among his many enemies Mabini, Mascardo, Janolino and the Kawit men and Felipe Buencamino who had done so much to promote Filipino interests abroad as Foreign Secretary.
The real, complicated anti-hero that was Felipe Buencamino will probably never be fully known by the Filipino people, who remember him for one thing only - deadly complicity in the hypothetical Luna assassination plot. The Felipe Buencamino who had had played an instrumental part in getting the First Republic off the ground, the Felipe Buencamino who had worked so hard for international recognition of the First Republic abroad, the Felipe Buencamino who (in President Lincoln's words) "laid so costly a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom" is lost to history thanks to this one fatal infamous and mutual hatred he had with Luna.
To understand Buencamino one must understand the development of the Philippine First Republic.
First, one must disabuse one's self of any sentimental nationalist notions of 'a free and independent Philippines in 1898'. That was just NOT going to happen in the imperialist/racist zeitgeist of the era. The British were particularly interested in a 'friendly' Great Power taking control of the Philippines before the Germans (who were very interested in adding the Philippines to the Reich) did. There are indeed only two (technically three) historical examples of "independent" nation states and all were in reality under some measure of foreign interest and control. These were Japan (influenced by Germany, France and most of all Britain), Siam/Thailand (who maintained independence by playing the colonial juggernauts of France - Indochina - and Britain - Malaya - off against each other) and Afghanistan (which was technically a British colony). Any idiot who thinks that the Filipinos were just going to be allowed to keep their independence in 1898 knows NOTHING ABOUT HISTORY.
One of the most common pathways to independence - one which the mighty United States itself took in 1776 - is to seek protection and alliance of a more powerful foreign nation to aid it in peaceful post-revolutionary growth and development via trade. This is what Aguinaldo was doing in Hong Kong and Singapore - he was trying to essentially sell the United States on the idea of being the Filipino's protector. While stupid ultra-nationalists see Aguinaldo as selling out the Philippines to the Americans, anyone with an understanding of colonial politics knows that a wise native leader will tell one thing to the Great Power ("I am the only man capable of governing these savage people and will certainly get you favorable trade concessions in exchange for protection") and another thing to his people ("I am the only man capable of preventing these imperialist powers from enslaving us and will certainly win you freedom and independence and prosperity from trade with our protector power"). That's just the way the game is played and Japan, Siam and even Afghanistan played that game successfully.
Aguinaldo needed the Filipinos to be seen as a civilized European-style nation. To this end he sent out diplomats to extoll the virtue of the Filipinos to the Americans, Europeans and Japanese, he established a European style government at Malolos and he hired Luna to train the Filipino Army of Liberation to fight like a civilized European military force. The idea was to LOOK CIVILIZED ENOUGH that a Great Power would become the Filipino First Republic's patron and protector.
This was where Luna and Buencamino diverged. Buencamino understood this reality and he fought for it, not because of some mythic business interest but because it was really the only way for Filipinos to be independent in 1898-1898. Luna wanted full independence without foreign interference. It was not unlike the struggle for Irish freedom in the 1920's with Michael Collins understanding that British dominion status was the best deal they could get short of British reoccupation while politically astute (and scheming) Eamon de Valera holding out for full independence knowing full well that it was impossible to attain at that point in time but also knowing full well that if he did this, he stood a good chance of becoming Ireland's undisputed leader afterwards.
THE AUTONOMY ISSUE
The autonomy issue split the Filipino government at the worst possible time - and it's almost certain that the Americans, who had years of experience short-changing the Native American Indians and taking their land, knew this and played on it, most notably by allowing Jacob Schurmann to take a commission to the islands and negotiate for some sort of peace. The Schurmann peace offer was just the carrot that Aguinaldo, Buencamino and other realists in the First Republic needed. Aguinaldo had tried, just after the Willie Grayson shooting of a Filipino soldier, to negotiate a ceasefire with Otis to which Otis replied that "the war, having started, must go on to its bloody end." The chance of peace, the chance to stop the suffering of his beloved people was something that Aguinaldo needed desperately - but not at an impossible price.
Interestingly, it is highly likely that General Gregorio del Pilar's inclusion as a delegate to the Schurmann Commission is what made him a post-war American hero for the Filipinos, mythically lionized as 'the Boy General' despite the greater claim to that title by the vastly more successful General Manuel Tinio. But I digress...
The Schurmann Commission split the Filipinos into the diehard freedom fighters and autonomists. The Spaniards, wanting to recoup some lost honor, as well as Antonio Luna, who was likely still chafing over unending defeats at American hands, wanted nothing to do with peace with the Gringos. Buencamino and the ever opportunistic Paterno were in the Autonomista Faction.
It was likely during this time of political animosity that a tragedy occurred which made the Luna-Buencamino fight a personal matter.
Major (Commandante) Joaquin Buencamino, Felipe's son, volunteered to serve under Antonio Luna's command. Luna accepted - perhaps unwisely - and the younger Buencamino was killed shortly afterwards under somewhat mysterious circumstances.
Felipe Buencamino blamed Antonio Luna for the death of his son.
On the fateful day, Sumaquel Hosalla and I have hypothesized that Aguinaldo never sent the telegraph - Felipe Buencamino did. Buencamino was Foreign Secretary and would likely have had access to the official presidential seal. It would not have been difficult for him to send a communique in Aguinaldo's name. Which is why Buencamino takes the letter after Luna is killed. It would implicate him particularly if Aguinaldo ever got hold of it.
Luna counted among his many enemies Mabini, Mascardo, Janolino and the Kawit men and Felipe Buencamino who had done so much to promote Filipino interests abroad as Foreign Secretary.
The real, complicated anti-hero that was Felipe Buencamino will probably never be fully known by the Filipino people, who remember him for one thing only - deadly complicity in the hypothetical Luna assassination plot. The Felipe Buencamino who had had played an instrumental part in getting the First Republic off the ground, the Felipe Buencamino who had worked so hard for international recognition of the First Republic abroad, the Felipe Buencamino who (in President Lincoln's words) "laid so costly a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom" is lost to history thanks to this one fatal infamous and mutual hatred he had with Luna.
To understand Buencamino one must understand the development of the Philippine First Republic.
First, one must disabuse one's self of any sentimental nationalist notions of 'a free and independent Philippines in 1898'. That was just NOT going to happen in the imperialist/racist zeitgeist of the era. The British were particularly interested in a 'friendly' Great Power taking control of the Philippines before the Germans (who were very interested in adding the Philippines to the Reich) did. There are indeed only two (technically three) historical examples of "independent" nation states and all were in reality under some measure of foreign interest and control. These were Japan (influenced by Germany, France and most of all Britain), Siam/Thailand (who maintained independence by playing the colonial juggernauts of France - Indochina - and Britain - Malaya - off against each other) and Afghanistan (which was technically a British colony). Any idiot who thinks that the Filipinos were just going to be allowed to keep their independence in 1898 knows NOTHING ABOUT HISTORY.
One of the most common pathways to independence - one which the mighty United States itself took in 1776 - is to seek protection and alliance of a more powerful foreign nation to aid it in peaceful post-revolutionary growth and development via trade. This is what Aguinaldo was doing in Hong Kong and Singapore - he was trying to essentially sell the United States on the idea of being the Filipino's protector. While stupid ultra-nationalists see Aguinaldo as selling out the Philippines to the Americans, anyone with an understanding of colonial politics knows that a wise native leader will tell one thing to the Great Power ("I am the only man capable of governing these savage people and will certainly get you favorable trade concessions in exchange for protection") and another thing to his people ("I am the only man capable of preventing these imperialist powers from enslaving us and will certainly win you freedom and independence and prosperity from trade with our protector power"). That's just the way the game is played and Japan, Siam and even Afghanistan played that game successfully.
Aguinaldo needed the Filipinos to be seen as a civilized European-style nation. To this end he sent out diplomats to extoll the virtue of the Filipinos to the Americans, Europeans and Japanese, he established a European style government at Malolos and he hired Luna to train the Filipino Army of Liberation to fight like a civilized European military force. The idea was to LOOK CIVILIZED ENOUGH that a Great Power would become the Filipino First Republic's patron and protector.
This was where Luna and Buencamino diverged. Buencamino understood this reality and he fought for it, not because of some mythic business interest but because it was really the only way for Filipinos to be independent in 1898-1898. Luna wanted full independence without foreign interference. It was not unlike the struggle for Irish freedom in the 1920's with Michael Collins understanding that British dominion status was the best deal they could get short of British reoccupation while politically astute (and scheming) Eamon de Valera holding out for full independence knowing full well that it was impossible to attain at that point in time but also knowing full well that if he did this, he stood a good chance of becoming Ireland's undisputed leader afterwards.
THE AUTONOMY ISSUE
The autonomy issue split the Filipino government at the worst possible time - and it's almost certain that the Americans, who had years of experience short-changing the Native American Indians and taking their land, knew this and played on it, most notably by allowing Jacob Schurmann to take a commission to the islands and negotiate for some sort of peace. The Schurmann peace offer was just the carrot that Aguinaldo, Buencamino and other realists in the First Republic needed. Aguinaldo had tried, just after the Willie Grayson shooting of a Filipino soldier, to negotiate a ceasefire with Otis to which Otis replied that "the war, having started, must go on to its bloody end." The chance of peace, the chance to stop the suffering of his beloved people was something that Aguinaldo needed desperately - but not at an impossible price.
Interestingly, it is highly likely that General Gregorio del Pilar's inclusion as a delegate to the Schurmann Commission is what made him a post-war American hero for the Filipinos, mythically lionized as 'the Boy General' despite the greater claim to that title by the vastly more successful General Manuel Tinio. But I digress...
The Schurmann Commission split the Filipinos into the diehard freedom fighters and autonomists. The Spaniards, wanting to recoup some lost honor, as well as Antonio Luna, who was likely still chafing over unending defeats at American hands, wanted nothing to do with peace with the Gringos. Buencamino and the ever opportunistic Paterno were in the Autonomista Faction.
It was likely during this time of political animosity that a tragedy occurred which made the Luna-Buencamino fight a personal matter.
Major (Commandante) Joaquin Buencamino, Felipe's son, volunteered to serve under Antonio Luna's command. Luna accepted - perhaps unwisely - and the younger Buencamino was killed shortly afterwards under somewhat mysterious circumstances.
Felipe Buencamino blamed Antonio Luna for the death of his son.
On the fateful day, Sumaquel Hosalla and I have hypothesized that Aguinaldo never sent the telegraph - Felipe Buencamino did. Buencamino was Foreign Secretary and would likely have had access to the official presidential seal. It would not have been difficult for him to send a communique in Aguinaldo's name. Which is why Buencamino takes the letter after Luna is killed. It would implicate him particularly if Aguinaldo ever got hold of it.
MASCARDO, FILIPINO PATRIOT, REVOLUTIONARY HERO - AND LUNA
HATER
The infamous Luna-Mascardo feud is just another example of Luna's failure to properly professionalize the Filipino Army of Liberation, though I will immediately add that it is doubtful tha anyone could have, even the American West Point graduates who fought against him, given the lack of time. Like any growing organism, time is essential for military hierarchies, psychological structures of command and communication infrastructure to grow, develop and establish itself within the military organization. Luna and the Filipinos just did not have the time.
On the eve of the extremely critical battle of Bagbag River - the best natural obstacle the Filipinos had to delay (not prevent, since the American Navy would be able to take troops and flank them if necessary) the northward American advance - General Antonio Luna took the army reserve troops and left the field to punish the recalcitrant General Tomas Mascardo.
Ambeth Ocampo brings out beautifully the exchange between Luna and Mascardo in a newspaper article. Luna is apparently screaming at Mascardo via courier mail in Spanish and mockingly asking Mascardo if he needed an interpreter, to which Mascardo replies with nationalistic pride, 'I am proud to speak my own language, Tagalog.'. Mascardo then dares Luna to come and get him, 'If Luna had the BALLS to come get him" (literally, if Luna had the BAYAG to come get him...) so as one can imagine, Luna got pissed off and took the army reserve just as the Americans were about to launch a major river crossing attack.
Filipinos love to trumpet how Luna was "The best Filipino general of the Phil-American War" - this claim is actually a paraphrase of AN AMERICAN OFFICER'S STATEMENT ABOUT LUNA. It's actually a highly questionable statement since Luna 1) never, as far as I can tell, went through an entire course of academic study comparable to what the Americans had at West Point and the British at Sandhurst to gain military knowledge and discipline, much less a real commissioned rank. 2) never won a battle he commanded - to be fair he was facing American generals with experience going back to the American Civil War, an American Navy that could outflank him whenever they wanted to, and American troops that were bred to highly accurate and effective handling of contemporary rifles thanks to the American passion for hunting - but Bagbag River represented a real chance to give the Americans a bloody nose - 3) never showed the level of personal discipline that he demanded of others on pain of death.
I've read through the War Department reports and what I saw shocked me. American casualties reported in various encounters were SHOCKINGLY LOW. Venereal disease and alcohol as well as tropical illness caused far more casualties than Filipino troops. Like the British in Africa, utilizing long outdated 'square tactics' in the face of poorly equipped hordes of native warriors, something they would not have dared do in the face of contemporary rifle-armed opponents, the Americans were able to make FRONTAL ATTACKS, RIVER CROSSINGS UNDER FIRE and other things that should have given them 30-50% casualties had they been facing the Spaniards (and the Santiago Campaign was not as much a cakewalk as American propaganda makes it out to be - American troops suffered bitterly heavy casualties from highly accurate Spanish fire thanks to the Spanish possessing one of the best infantry weapons of the 20th Century, the German-designed Mauser Rifle. The Filipinos inherited, stole and purchased thousands of Mausers as well but lack of time, ammunition and training nullified what should have been a war-winning advantage - it would be like if the North Vietnamese had used their AK-47's as single-shot weapons throughout the Vietnam conflict.)
A study of Luna's Manila campaign shows that Luna, for all his hype, demanded far too much of his poorly trained troops and self-declared general officers. One of the most important institutions in any army is a staff college - a general's staff is key to winning victories as they handle communications, coordination,logistics, training, etc. leaving the general free to strategize and/or lead from the front. Luna - and again it's as much if not more the fault of a lack of time - showed extremely shoddy staff work in his assault on Manila. Poorly coordinated attacks between advancing columns. Utterly uncoordinated and half-hearted assaults by the fifth-column Sandatahan "terrorist" units within the city. Ironically, in this battle the Kawit Battalion performed well and captured their assigned objectives.
Luna as a general failed because he did not have the time to make his vision for the Filipino Army a reality. Failing this, he failed to take adequate steps to compensate for this. No plan survives first contact with the enemy - or with adversity for that matter - and it is a GREAT general that is able to surmount these obstacles IN SPITE OF ADVERSITY.
Napoleon Buonaparte was an unknown, Corsican fromdi (to use the Pinoy term) who had made good crushing Royalist riots in Paris and successfully taking the vital port of Toulon. He was given the command of the Army of Italy, men who were half-starved, unpaid, wore tattered uniforms and worn-out boots (if they had boots at all), many were undisciplined volunteers with no military experience outside butchering poorly armed/unarmed counterrevolutionaries, and the government had no money to pay them but expected Buonaparte to perform or be guilotined.
Napoleon took that rag-tag army and conquered the Italian peninsula. He made no excuses. He didn't complain about the lack of time or lack of funds or lack of training. He got the job done. He defeated the best Austrian commanders and made a name for himself.
This is why I cannot give a free pass to either Bonifacio or Antonio Luna. They may have been patriots and heroes but they were not, ultimately, great generals for the simple fact that they failed to overcome their own and their army's limitations.
The infamous Luna-Mascardo feud is just another example of Luna's failure to properly professionalize the Filipino Army of Liberation, though I will immediately add that it is doubtful tha anyone could have, even the American West Point graduates who fought against him, given the lack of time. Like any growing organism, time is essential for military hierarchies, psychological structures of command and communication infrastructure to grow, develop and establish itself within the military organization. Luna and the Filipinos just did not have the time.
On the eve of the extremely critical battle of Bagbag River - the best natural obstacle the Filipinos had to delay (not prevent, since the American Navy would be able to take troops and flank them if necessary) the northward American advance - General Antonio Luna took the army reserve troops and left the field to punish the recalcitrant General Tomas Mascardo.
Ambeth Ocampo brings out beautifully the exchange between Luna and Mascardo in a newspaper article. Luna is apparently screaming at Mascardo via courier mail in Spanish and mockingly asking Mascardo if he needed an interpreter, to which Mascardo replies with nationalistic pride, 'I am proud to speak my own language, Tagalog.'. Mascardo then dares Luna to come and get him, 'If Luna had the BALLS to come get him" (literally, if Luna had the BAYAG to come get him...) so as one can imagine, Luna got pissed off and took the army reserve just as the Americans were about to launch a major river crossing attack.
Filipinos love to trumpet how Luna was "The best Filipino general of the Phil-American War" - this claim is actually a paraphrase of AN AMERICAN OFFICER'S STATEMENT ABOUT LUNA. It's actually a highly questionable statement since Luna 1) never, as far as I can tell, went through an entire course of academic study comparable to what the Americans had at West Point and the British at Sandhurst to gain military knowledge and discipline, much less a real commissioned rank. 2) never won a battle he commanded - to be fair he was facing American generals with experience going back to the American Civil War, an American Navy that could outflank him whenever they wanted to, and American troops that were bred to highly accurate and effective handling of contemporary rifles thanks to the American passion for hunting - but Bagbag River represented a real chance to give the Americans a bloody nose - 3) never showed the level of personal discipline that he demanded of others on pain of death.
I've read through the War Department reports and what I saw shocked me. American casualties reported in various encounters were SHOCKINGLY LOW. Venereal disease and alcohol as well as tropical illness caused far more casualties than Filipino troops. Like the British in Africa, utilizing long outdated 'square tactics' in the face of poorly equipped hordes of native warriors, something they would not have dared do in the face of contemporary rifle-armed opponents, the Americans were able to make FRONTAL ATTACKS, RIVER CROSSINGS UNDER FIRE and other things that should have given them 30-50% casualties had they been facing the Spaniards (and the Santiago Campaign was not as much a cakewalk as American propaganda makes it out to be - American troops suffered bitterly heavy casualties from highly accurate Spanish fire thanks to the Spanish possessing one of the best infantry weapons of the 20th Century, the German-designed Mauser Rifle. The Filipinos inherited, stole and purchased thousands of Mausers as well but lack of time, ammunition and training nullified what should have been a war-winning advantage - it would be like if the North Vietnamese had used their AK-47's as single-shot weapons throughout the Vietnam conflict.)
A study of Luna's Manila campaign shows that Luna, for all his hype, demanded far too much of his poorly trained troops and self-declared general officers. One of the most important institutions in any army is a staff college - a general's staff is key to winning victories as they handle communications, coordination,logistics, training, etc. leaving the general free to strategize and/or lead from the front. Luna - and again it's as much if not more the fault of a lack of time - showed extremely shoddy staff work in his assault on Manila. Poorly coordinated attacks between advancing columns. Utterly uncoordinated and half-hearted assaults by the fifth-column Sandatahan "terrorist" units within the city. Ironically, in this battle the Kawit Battalion performed well and captured their assigned objectives.
Luna as a general failed because he did not have the time to make his vision for the Filipino Army a reality. Failing this, he failed to take adequate steps to compensate for this. No plan survives first contact with the enemy - or with adversity for that matter - and it is a GREAT general that is able to surmount these obstacles IN SPITE OF ADVERSITY.
Napoleon Buonaparte was an unknown, Corsican fromdi (to use the Pinoy term) who had made good crushing Royalist riots in Paris and successfully taking the vital port of Toulon. He was given the command of the Army of Italy, men who were half-starved, unpaid, wore tattered uniforms and worn-out boots (if they had boots at all), many were undisciplined volunteers with no military experience outside butchering poorly armed/unarmed counterrevolutionaries, and the government had no money to pay them but expected Buonaparte to perform or be guilotined.
Napoleon took that rag-tag army and conquered the Italian peninsula. He made no excuses. He didn't complain about the lack of time or lack of funds or lack of training. He got the job done. He defeated the best Austrian commanders and made a name for himself.
This is why I cannot give a free pass to either Bonifacio or Antonio Luna. They may have been patriots and heroes but they were not, ultimately, great generals for the simple fact that they failed to overcome their own and their army's limitations.
A QUESTION OF CONSPIRACY: WHY AN AGUINALDO ASSASSINATION
MAKES NO LOGICAL SENSE
Now to the day in question. Here I want to examine the event purely through the mental processes of both Luna and Aguinaldo.
When Luna received the fateful telegram purportedly from Aguinaldo he rushed to Cabanatuan to confer with his boss and take back the command position that he felt should have been his all along. He took with him his immediate staff and a small cavalry escort for protection.
When Luna came to a ford in a river he abandoned the cavalry escort and most of his staff officers, taking only Paco Roman and a few others. He was not expecting to walk into an ambush.
Yet this is the man that took a reinforced brigade including artillery and an armored train to punish the recalcitrant Mascardo. And Aguinaldo would have been aware of this.
When Luna arrived at Cabanatuan, he was met not by Aguinaldo and not by a full battalion of Kawit soldiers but rather an under-strength company under command of Pedrong Kastila, Pedro Janolino. Now given that Aguinaldo knew that Luna was capable of taking a reinforced brigade of several hundred men into the field why was he defending his HQ with less than 50 soldiers and, if the conspiracy theory is true, counting on them to murder his alleged rival Antonio Luna. An understrength company of less than 50 men would not be able to withstand several hundred soldiers in a brigade, plus artillery and cavalry assets. Aguinaldo did not know how many men Luna was taking to Cabanatuan. Yet Aguinaldo, if there was a conspiracy, complacently puts his faith in less than 50 men to face potentially hundreds of Luna soldiers.
Furthermore, Aguinaldo's headquarters and family is at Cabanatuan. Does Aguinaldo really want to put his staff and his own family into a battle zone? Again, remembering that Luna could potentially bring several hundred soldiers with him and Aguinaldo did not know how many soldiers Luna was bringing with him?
Would anyone actually stage an assassination at their own home, utilizing their own servants?
Luna had to cross a river before getting to Cabanatuan. That would have been a more logical place for Aguinaldo to deploy a defense line. But he was allowed to come all the way to Cabanatuan.
Knowing the division and demoralization that could take place from killing Luna, would it be worth the risk to Aguinaldo?
For his part, Luna could have taken a large force with him. His self-saving squealing to the Spaniards in 1896 shows that he had no martyrs complex - he wanted to live. He could have called for a cavalry squadron and maybe a battalion of infantry and some cannon to protect him as he went to see Aguinaldo. But is this what Luna does? No. He takes a small cavalry escort and his staff and when he has trouble bringing all his guys across a river crossing he LEAVES HIS BODYGUARD (the cavalry) BEHIND. This was not a guy expecting trouble.
What is more, I think we can read into this lack of concern about his own safety Luna's own attitude toward Aguinaldo - whatever it was it wasn't hostility. Aguinaldo had promoted him above and beyond veteran heroes of 1896 like Mascardo, given him a wide range of powers. Luna was beholden to Aguinaldo and I'd like to think that he considered Aguinaldo a friend.
Aguinaldo would doubtless have heard the circulating rumors of a Luna coup. That there were rumors is a historical fact. Who spread these rumors is anyone's guess but it's not hard to assume that they were spread by those who stood to gain the most from a conflict between Luna and Aguinaldo - the Americans.History records that Aguinaldo was away from Cabanatuan that day, making a snap field inspection of General Venancio Concepcion's headquarters. Concepcion was one of the suspected 'Luna loyalists'. Again, America had everything to gain and nothing to lose by sowing dissention in the Filipino ranks and it is not unbelievable to assume that Filipino hirelings working for the American intelligence services were making sure these rumors reached Aguinaldo.
There is also the possibility that the letter Buencamino retrieved which Luna got was an American fabrication. It's also possible, given his defection shortly afterwards, that Buencamino was already working for the Americans.
Finally, the idea that Aguinaldo left the job to his 'hirelings' to absolve him of blame is utterly out of character for a man who 1) led from the front all throughout the revolution from Imus to Biak na Bato, even refusing to leave his post to assume the presidency until big-brother Crispulo promised to hold the vital Pasong Santol defenses in his place 2) refused to campaign for presidency at Imus and Tejeros, preferring the ilustrado Edilberto Evangelista or his cousin, the politically astute Baldomero, instead and 3) had offered to resign as overall leader/president in mid 1898 and serve as a common general except Mabini talked him out of it. Aguinaldo would have been aware of the importance of personal honor, of taking responsibility for his own actions and he would not have delegated the extermination of his alleged hated rival, Antonio Luna, to Pedrong Kastila. He would have done it himself. Given his knowledge of terrain he would likely have met Luna's forces at the river crossing and demanded that Luna confess any complicity he had in the rumored coup. It would have been messy but it would likely not have led to Luna's death. Luna would have suffered a loss of confidence and might have been busted down to division commander or maybe even dismissed entirely, at least for a time. Aguinaldo was not bloodthirsty as witness his desire to have Bonifacio exiled instead of executed. Luna would have fallen from grace but Aguinaldo would have rehabilitated him. After all, Aguinaldo himself believed in Luna's capabilities as a general.
All this being said, the small size of Aguinaldo's HQ defense forces and the presence of not only his HQ staff but his family - his mother notably - in the face of a possible Luna brigade-sized coup corps proves that if there was a Luna assassination conspiracy, it was VERY BADLY PLANNED TO THE POINT OF UTTER INEPTITUDE AND ONLY SUCCEEDED THROUGH SHEER LUCK BECAUSE LUNA FAILED TO REALIZE THE DANGER HE WAS IN.
This fails the Ockams Razor test miserably. Is it not more reasonable to believe that what really happened was that Luna went to Cabanatuan under the false pretence established by the mysterious letter which Buencamino or the Americans or Buencamino working for the Americans had actually sent and that Luna's bullying of the understrength Kawit Company upon arrival at Cabanatuan had actually triggered the UNPLANNED MURDER OF LUNA?
Once again, Luna could have and should have taken a far stronger bodyguard corps with him and he had the capacity to do this. Even a squadron of cavalry with infantry support and a couple of field cannon would have DEVASTATED THE UNDERSTRENGTH KAWIT COMPANY HQ GUARD. Luna had taken far more troops to 'punish' Mascardo and he could have taken far more troops to Cabanatuan if he felt his life was in danger.
Now to the day in question. Here I want to examine the event purely through the mental processes of both Luna and Aguinaldo.
When Luna received the fateful telegram purportedly from Aguinaldo he rushed to Cabanatuan to confer with his boss and take back the command position that he felt should have been his all along. He took with him his immediate staff and a small cavalry escort for protection.
When Luna came to a ford in a river he abandoned the cavalry escort and most of his staff officers, taking only Paco Roman and a few others. He was not expecting to walk into an ambush.
Yet this is the man that took a reinforced brigade including artillery and an armored train to punish the recalcitrant Mascardo. And Aguinaldo would have been aware of this.
When Luna arrived at Cabanatuan, he was met not by Aguinaldo and not by a full battalion of Kawit soldiers but rather an under-strength company under command of Pedrong Kastila, Pedro Janolino. Now given that Aguinaldo knew that Luna was capable of taking a reinforced brigade of several hundred men into the field why was he defending his HQ with less than 50 soldiers and, if the conspiracy theory is true, counting on them to murder his alleged rival Antonio Luna. An understrength company of less than 50 men would not be able to withstand several hundred soldiers in a brigade, plus artillery and cavalry assets. Aguinaldo did not know how many men Luna was taking to Cabanatuan. Yet Aguinaldo, if there was a conspiracy, complacently puts his faith in less than 50 men to face potentially hundreds of Luna soldiers.
Furthermore, Aguinaldo's headquarters and family is at Cabanatuan. Does Aguinaldo really want to put his staff and his own family into a battle zone? Again, remembering that Luna could potentially bring several hundred soldiers with him and Aguinaldo did not know how many soldiers Luna was bringing with him?
Would anyone actually stage an assassination at their own home, utilizing their own servants?
Luna had to cross a river before getting to Cabanatuan. That would have been a more logical place for Aguinaldo to deploy a defense line. But he was allowed to come all the way to Cabanatuan.
Knowing the division and demoralization that could take place from killing Luna, would it be worth the risk to Aguinaldo?
For his part, Luna could have taken a large force with him. His self-saving squealing to the Spaniards in 1896 shows that he had no martyrs complex - he wanted to live. He could have called for a cavalry squadron and maybe a battalion of infantry and some cannon to protect him as he went to see Aguinaldo. But is this what Luna does? No. He takes a small cavalry escort and his staff and when he has trouble bringing all his guys across a river crossing he LEAVES HIS BODYGUARD (the cavalry) BEHIND. This was not a guy expecting trouble.
What is more, I think we can read into this lack of concern about his own safety Luna's own attitude toward Aguinaldo - whatever it was it wasn't hostility. Aguinaldo had promoted him above and beyond veteran heroes of 1896 like Mascardo, given him a wide range of powers. Luna was beholden to Aguinaldo and I'd like to think that he considered Aguinaldo a friend.
Aguinaldo would doubtless have heard the circulating rumors of a Luna coup. That there were rumors is a historical fact. Who spread these rumors is anyone's guess but it's not hard to assume that they were spread by those who stood to gain the most from a conflict between Luna and Aguinaldo - the Americans.History records that Aguinaldo was away from Cabanatuan that day, making a snap field inspection of General Venancio Concepcion's headquarters. Concepcion was one of the suspected 'Luna loyalists'. Again, America had everything to gain and nothing to lose by sowing dissention in the Filipino ranks and it is not unbelievable to assume that Filipino hirelings working for the American intelligence services were making sure these rumors reached Aguinaldo.
There is also the possibility that the letter Buencamino retrieved which Luna got was an American fabrication. It's also possible, given his defection shortly afterwards, that Buencamino was already working for the Americans.
Finally, the idea that Aguinaldo left the job to his 'hirelings' to absolve him of blame is utterly out of character for a man who 1) led from the front all throughout the revolution from Imus to Biak na Bato, even refusing to leave his post to assume the presidency until big-brother Crispulo promised to hold the vital Pasong Santol defenses in his place 2) refused to campaign for presidency at Imus and Tejeros, preferring the ilustrado Edilberto Evangelista or his cousin, the politically astute Baldomero, instead and 3) had offered to resign as overall leader/president in mid 1898 and serve as a common general except Mabini talked him out of it. Aguinaldo would have been aware of the importance of personal honor, of taking responsibility for his own actions and he would not have delegated the extermination of his alleged hated rival, Antonio Luna, to Pedrong Kastila. He would have done it himself. Given his knowledge of terrain he would likely have met Luna's forces at the river crossing and demanded that Luna confess any complicity he had in the rumored coup. It would have been messy but it would likely not have led to Luna's death. Luna would have suffered a loss of confidence and might have been busted down to division commander or maybe even dismissed entirely, at least for a time. Aguinaldo was not bloodthirsty as witness his desire to have Bonifacio exiled instead of executed. Luna would have fallen from grace but Aguinaldo would have rehabilitated him. After all, Aguinaldo himself believed in Luna's capabilities as a general.
All this being said, the small size of Aguinaldo's HQ defense forces and the presence of not only his HQ staff but his family - his mother notably - in the face of a possible Luna brigade-sized coup corps proves that if there was a Luna assassination conspiracy, it was VERY BADLY PLANNED TO THE POINT OF UTTER INEPTITUDE AND ONLY SUCCEEDED THROUGH SHEER LUCK BECAUSE LUNA FAILED TO REALIZE THE DANGER HE WAS IN.
This fails the Ockams Razor test miserably. Is it not more reasonable to believe that what really happened was that Luna went to Cabanatuan under the false pretence established by the mysterious letter which Buencamino or the Americans or Buencamino working for the Americans had actually sent and that Luna's bullying of the understrength Kawit Company upon arrival at Cabanatuan had actually triggered the UNPLANNED MURDER OF LUNA?
Once again, Luna could have and should have taken a far stronger bodyguard corps with him and he had the capacity to do this. Even a squadron of cavalry with infantry support and a couple of field cannon would have DEVASTATED THE UNDERSTRENGTH KAWIT COMPANY HQ GUARD. Luna had taken far more troops to 'punish' Mascardo and he could have taken far more troops to Cabanatuan if he felt his life was in danger.
FINAL ISSUES - GUMAGALAW PA BA YAN?
That Aguinaldo ordered the arrest and interrogation of Luna loyalists after the assassination speaks less to the existence of a mythical conspiracy and more to the reality that Aguinaldo would have to deal sternly with possible coup/rebellion efforts by Luna loyalists. His experience with Bonifacio would have forewarned him of this danger.
While tragic and wasteful, it does not seem that, outside of the Bernal brothers, Aguinaldo wanted a blood purge of his enemies. Alejandrino was arrested for a while but then was back on the job. Luna's own family including the famous Juan never blamed Aguinaldo for their brother's death.
As for the Kawit Battalion, the Luna murder was an indelible black mark on their records. Mr.Sumaquel Hosalla's research shows that the Kawit Battalion disappears from the orders of battle of the Army of Liberation. It was replaced by loyal troops from Tinio's Brigade and the Gregorio del Pilar Brigade. This punishment is characteristic of Aguinaldo's humanity, refusing to demand blood when exile will do.
The only evidence we have for an Aguinaldo conspiracy is an AMERICAN NEWSPAPER ARTICLE most likely based on Paterno's NON-EYEWITNESS narrative. And who stood the most to gain from Aguinaldo being blamed for Luna's death?
The oft-told tale of Aguinaldo's mother saying callously "Gumagalaw pa ba yan?" in reference to Luna's dead body is not the only narrative of the event. Another narrative has her angrily condemining the Kawit soldiers for murdering Luna. But that version just doesn't fit the myth of the great Aguinaldo conspiracy to murder General Luna so it's never broadcast.
Sadly, gumagalaw at gumagalaw ang mito ni Heneral Luna, a myth that is mostly American made and stamped upon the Filipino consciousness by years of American miseducation and Leftist/pseudo-nationalist mythologizing. Like Bonifacio and even Gregorio del Pilar, Antonio Luna's historic reality was recreated by America and the pseudo-nationalist left as a club with which to pummel the memory and legacy of the First President and Greatest General of the Philippine Revolution, to give us Filipinos a collective amnesia of Aguinaldo's long, hopeless, insanely courageous resistance to American imperialist rule. By casting Aguinaldo in the role of the villain and recreating Bonifacio, Del Pilar and Luna as tragic innocent victims of Aguinaldo's mythical greed, insecurity, hunger for power and whatever polemic can be imagined, America secured its dominance over the Filipino psyche through revisionist history and we Filipinos, by continuing to beat up Aguinaldo with these myths, demolish our own legacy of unyielding courage and heroic resistance to western imperialism.
That Aguinaldo ordered the arrest and interrogation of Luna loyalists after the assassination speaks less to the existence of a mythical conspiracy and more to the reality that Aguinaldo would have to deal sternly with possible coup/rebellion efforts by Luna loyalists. His experience with Bonifacio would have forewarned him of this danger.
While tragic and wasteful, it does not seem that, outside of the Bernal brothers, Aguinaldo wanted a blood purge of his enemies. Alejandrino was arrested for a while but then was back on the job. Luna's own family including the famous Juan never blamed Aguinaldo for their brother's death.
As for the Kawit Battalion, the Luna murder was an indelible black mark on their records. Mr.Sumaquel Hosalla's research shows that the Kawit Battalion disappears from the orders of battle of the Army of Liberation. It was replaced by loyal troops from Tinio's Brigade and the Gregorio del Pilar Brigade. This punishment is characteristic of Aguinaldo's humanity, refusing to demand blood when exile will do.
The only evidence we have for an Aguinaldo conspiracy is an AMERICAN NEWSPAPER ARTICLE most likely based on Paterno's NON-EYEWITNESS narrative. And who stood the most to gain from Aguinaldo being blamed for Luna's death?
The oft-told tale of Aguinaldo's mother saying callously "Gumagalaw pa ba yan?" in reference to Luna's dead body is not the only narrative of the event. Another narrative has her angrily condemining the Kawit soldiers for murdering Luna. But that version just doesn't fit the myth of the great Aguinaldo conspiracy to murder General Luna so it's never broadcast.
Sadly, gumagalaw at gumagalaw ang mito ni Heneral Luna, a myth that is mostly American made and stamped upon the Filipino consciousness by years of American miseducation and Leftist/pseudo-nationalist mythologizing. Like Bonifacio and even Gregorio del Pilar, Antonio Luna's historic reality was recreated by America and the pseudo-nationalist left as a club with which to pummel the memory and legacy of the First President and Greatest General of the Philippine Revolution, to give us Filipinos a collective amnesia of Aguinaldo's long, hopeless, insanely courageous resistance to American imperialist rule. By casting Aguinaldo in the role of the villain and recreating Bonifacio, Del Pilar and Luna as tragic innocent victims of Aguinaldo's mythical greed, insecurity, hunger for power and whatever polemic can be imagined, America secured its dominance over the Filipino psyche through revisionist history and we Filipinos, by continuing to beat up Aguinaldo with these myths, demolish our own legacy of unyielding courage and heroic resistance to western imperialism.
If the Tarrog-Rocha love team butchered
Heneral Luna so badly, why does anyone assume they will do better with Goyo?#
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