The Bonifacio Tragedy in Context

By Tommy Matic IV and Basilio Ibabawan

The things to remember about the Bonifacio arrest/trial/execution are:

1) It never would have happened if Bonifacio had never come to Cavite. In a communication with Santiago Alvarez, Bonifacio said that he "will not remain long in Cavite but would return and harass the enemy from other fronts" and would "not meddle in local politics". He kept neither promise.

2) Magdalo and Magdiwang were both local Caviteño Katipunan Councils (Sanggunian) and were not "factions" much less not "national pro Bonifacio and anti Bonifacio parties". The Magdiwang was led by the Alvarez clan and were never "Bonifacio's faction" - to the contrary, the Alvarez's hoped to use Bonifacio as their pansabong against Aguinaldo. The fact that BOTH Councils decided to unite and form a new Revolutionary Government outside the Katipunan shows that they were more independent-minded and if this constituted "a betrayal of Bonifacio/the Katipunan" then it was not just the Aguinaldo's and their followers that were complicit.

3) A big mistake in the Filipino historical educational system and in thinking of the Bonifacio execution in general is divorcing the event from a) it's motivations and b) it's historical context. Things do not happen in a vacuum but rather are the result of reactions to other actions. Bonifacio's behavior in Cavite went from annoying (alienating the Magdalo who had previous had no quarrel with him, and threatening the unity of the Cavite Revolutionaries), to immature (his actions at the Tejeros Convention, including violent threats and a refusal to abide by his own oath which he, as President of the Convention, had made everyone swear), to seditious (forming a counter revolutionary government at Naik and attempting to to steal the loyalty of two Magdalo generals), to openly counter revolutionary (assaulting a Magdiwang town, Indang, that had refused to provision him). After this, AguiNaldo ordered the arrest of the Bonifacios.


4) Bonifacio's arrest was carried out by troops that were, like all the rest of the Katipunan forces were, tribal/warlord type armies in nature, meaning that their loyalty was mainly and primarily to their direct commander. Loyalty was via patronage, social and personal debt, charisma and maintained via threats, charisma and displays of strength plus most important, battlefield victory. This was not a highly evolved military organization like the modern Philippine military, but rather more like the Game of Thrones feudal armies or a Mafia godfather's gangsters. As such, Aguinaldo had almost no control over the arresting troops and officers unless he had directly supervised them, which he didn't. And there could no "command responsibility" because of the warlord nature of the forces. So while Col.Agapito "Yntong" Bonzon by all accounts behaved deplorably, this cannot be blamed on Aguinaldo.

5) The Arrest, Consejo de Guerra, and Execution were agreed upon by the United Revolutionary Government of both Magdalo and Magdiwang. Both Magdalo and Magdiwang members sat on and agreed upon the verdict of the Consejo de Guerra. Magdiwang never lifted a finger to rescue Bonifacio. The great irony is that the one person who wanted to save Bonifacio's life was Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo, as president could have opposed Noriel and P. Del Pilar but it would have been extremely risky, given the warlord nature of the Revolution armies.

Testimony of Pedro Giron given during Bonifacio's trial

Many historians dismissed the testimony of Pedro Giron during the trial of Andres Bonifacio because they claim it was made under duress or he was pressured or bribed to lie in an effort by the followers of Aguinaldo to put down Andres Bonifacio. But in the light of the “Acta de Tejeros” or Bonifacio's election protest with his demand for all elected officials to vacate their posts and the failed coup d'etat he initiated as documented in "Acta de Naic" or the “Naik Military Agreement”, where it was revealed Bonifacio wanted Aguinaldo killed, two events that these historians similarly pushed aside and ignore, Giron's testimony apparently jibes with the events and therefore deserves a second look. This damaging testimony confirmed the plans of Bonifacio to regain power and assassinate Aguinaldo. Here is the full text of Pedro Giron's testimony lifted from Taylor's PIR, 1:315-316)

“At the barracks of Naic, on this thirtieth day of April of the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety-seven, before the investigating Judge appeared Pedro Giron, unmarried, twenty-seven years old, born in the pueblo of Baliwag, Bulacan, and upon being duly sworn testified as follows:

Q. Do you know that there is a Government ruling over this territory supported by an army? - A. Yes, I do.

Q. Does Andres Bonifacio hold any office within the gift of this Government, and, as such authorized to recruit and keep troops under this command? - A. I do not know that he had any office or authority at all.

Q. What was the number of men and rifles at Andres Bonifacio's disposal? - A. I was in the capacity of a soldier of Andres Bonifacio and cannot tell anything about the number of his men and rifles. I was reluctant in joining him, for I knew that, since the meeting which took place in the town of Tansa for the election of a President and other high officials of the Government, he was entertaining intentions which were not at all favorable to it. One day, the date of which I do not recollect, Andres Bonifacio came to me and said: “let us go away from this place, you had all better come with me, for something unpleasant may happen to him [Aguinaldo] and his followers; simply because he started this revolutionary movement he believes himself to be entitled to hold the leadership of the same.” After some twenty days, more or less, when all the forces from Tansa had already come over to this place, Andres Bonifacio sent for me, and when I arrived to his house, he said to me: “we shall stay here; in spite of Captain Emilio the leadership of this movement belongs to me; I must outrank him or will have him killed.” On that same day he gave me ten pesos in order that I would carry out his wishes of killing Aguinaldo, in case that the latter should not yield to him the leadership of the insurrection, begging me not to disappoint him as he would liberally reward me for my deed. As things were, I thought that something wrong would happen and without the loss of a moment I left him [Bonifacio] and went to Buenavista, within the jurisdiction of Malabon [San Francisco de Malabon] with a party of infantry soldiers from the towns of Silang, Perez Dasmarinas, Malabon, and Tansa. I knew that Andres Bonifacio was recruiting men to resist the troops that were going to be sent by this Government, and I knew also that he had planned to overthrow Aguinaldo's authority, which he said belonged to him; his own soldiers can testify as to the truth of my assertion; I advised him to abandon his position, to which he objected, for, he said, he did not want the people to think that he was afraid of those who were in power.

Q. Were Andres Bonifacio's brothers all acquainted with everything the former was planning? - A. I believe not.

Q. Were there any meetings held at the house of Andres Bonifacio at Limbong, and, if so, who attended, and what was discussed? - A. I knew that they were frequently holding meetings at their house, but as I am a stranger I cannot tell who those attending were or what was discussed in them.

Q. Where did the food of Andres Bonifacio's men came from, and who gave it to them? - A. I cannot tell anything about that.

Q. Have you any further statement to make besides what you have said above? - A. Early on Tuesday morning I was in Limbong when the firing of rifles between Bonifacio brothers and the troops of this Government started. I tried to use my best efforts to quiet them down to no avail, as Ciriaco at the moment emptied his weapon, the bullets of which cause the death of two soldiers of this Government; I shouted that we being born in the same country should not fight each other, but no one would listen to me.

Upon having read the foregoing testimony the witness ratified it by signing his name, to which I, the Secretary, attest with my signature.”

(Signed by: Pedro Giron, Lazaro Makapagal and Pantaleon Garcia)

Mabini on Aguinaldo

by Angelo J. Aguinaldo

Said Mabini of Aguinaldo:

 "The Revolution failed because it was badly directed, because its leader won his post not with praiseworthy but with blameworthy acts, because instead of employing the most useful men of the nation he jealously discarded them. Believing that the advance of the people was no more than his own personal advance, he did not rate men according to their ability, character and patriotism but according to the degree of friendship or kinship binding him to them; and wanting to have favorites willing to sacrifice themselves for him, he showed himself lenient to their faults. Because he disdained the people, he could not but fall like an idol of wax melting in the heat of adversity. May we never forget such a terrible lesson learned at the cost of unspeakable sufferings!"
(Source: http://j.mp/Malacanang)

Aguinaldo, the leader Mabini was referring to, got elected in absentia. Being chief flag officer of the Magdalo Council, he commanded the revolutionary force which was pinned down in a seesaw battle with Spanish General Jose Lachambre’s army in Pasong Santol. He refused to leave the battle front until Crispulo, his older brother, vowed to take his place so he, together with Mariano Trias could take their oath as elected President and vice-president. The election was presided over by Magdiwang Council. Only Aguinaldo was elected among the officers of the Magdalo. Crispulo died in the Battle of Pasong Santol.  That’s not blameworthy. Mabini did not even see action during the first phase of the Revolution.

On Aguinaldo’s jealously discarding some useful men:

Dencio Yuson, an observer, has this to say: "The Full Story of Aguinaldo's Capture" by Lazaro Segovia (1969ed). The appendix contains an article by American journalist O.K Davis which appeared in Everybody's Magazine Vol.V Aug. 1901 that contains the remarkable unpublished "Aguinaldo Resignation Letter". I will excerpt the following from the said article:

In December, 1898, at the time when the Filipinos were in the hey-day of their power, Aguinaldo wrote a letter resigning the office of the president of the revolutionary government. For eight months they had been perfecting their organization and increasing their strength... They understood, both leaders and people, that the conflict with the Americans was approaching rapidly. 

He (Aguinaldo) went on to say... that the crisis was too great for him to deal with, that it required a man of greater strength and better education, an abler and older man to lead them through the difficulties which were before them... and he asked the people to give him as 'Aguinaldo', release from the office of the president, and allow him to resign in favor of a man more fitted than he to guide them.

 his letter was never circulated. Mabini and his colleagues discovered that Aguinaldo had written it and they succeeded in persuading or compelling him to suppress it. THE TRUTH IS THAT AGUINALDO WAS THE IDOL OF THE FILIPINOS, THOUSANDS OF WHOM WOULD FOLLOW HIM BLINDLY WITH ABSOLUTE CONFIDENCE. IF THAT LETTER HAD BEEN MADE PUBLIC BY AGUINALDO THE INSURRECTION WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE. 

Too bad, that the whole letter was not published along with the article. This letter proves that Aguinaldo was not the scheming, power hungry TRAPO politician, an image prevailing today.

 Mabini may have also referred to himself when he said: “because instead of employing the most useful men of the nation he jealously discarded them.” He resigned from the Cabinet due to intrigues and other members of the Cabinet began seeing him as Gen. Aguinaldo’s “dark chamber.”

Mabini opposed the declaration of Philippine Independence on June 12, 1898 and instead suggested the reorganization of the government. Aguinaldo, however, felt otherwise. He believed that the proclamation would serve as a great rallying point.

Felipe Agoncillo recommended Apolinario Mabini and  Antonio Luna. Mabini became Prime Minister; Antonio Luna was promoted several times even to the rank of lieutenant general. So, that may have been the favoritism Mabini noted.

Said Aguinaldo of Luna in an interview conducted by Vicente Albano Pacis (A Second Look at America, New York, 1957):

“Neither, indeed, did Luna go to a military school, for he was a pharmacist by training; but in addition to his undeniable valor, he was an avid student of military theory and history. Not only was he our ablest commander but also he had the foresight and ability to open and operate a military school with which he trained most of our officers. We need him to keep our forces as a coordinated unit. And we needed even his terrible temper to impose discipline on our unschooled army.”

And Mabini had reservations to Luna’s appointment. He event wrote Emilio Aguinaldo on March 7, 1899 (a month after the start of the Philippine-American War) asking the latter NOT to give to Gen. Antonio Luna the position of Secretary of War and calling the general "a despot" and not fit to command an Army ("Kundi bagay sa mando ng Hokbo ay lalong hindi sa oficina, sapagkat despota").

It is not surprising that Mabini changed his opinion of Aguinaldo when he was exiled in Guam as he expressed in his Memoir “La Revoluciion Filipina.” He blamed everybody whom he thought abandoned him. Also, he was likely influenced by Artemio Ricarte who was also with him in Guam. Ricarte also had an axe to grind against Aguinaldo.

Credits: Dencio Yuson, Dr. Vic Torres, Alfredo B. Saulo.