AGAW-ARMAS - ANG SIMULA NG PAGHIHIMAGSIK NI AGUINALDO SA CAVITE ni Virgilio Leynes

Ang “Sigaw ng Kabite,” na naganap kinabukasan, ika-31 ng Agosto (taong 1896) ay isang kagiliw-giliw na halimbawa ng pagkakaiba sa pagitan ng proletaryado ng Maynila at ng mga rebolusyonaryo ng Kabite. Ang pangunahing layunin ni Aguinaldo ay makakuha ng mga sandata upang ipaglaban ang bayan laban sa kaaway. Bilang kapitang bayan, may malinaw siyang kalamangan sa Supremo na si Bonifacio at sa mga Katipunero ng Maynila: gagamitin niya ang kanyang katungkulan upang maisakatuparan ang kanyang layunin. Siya’y gagamit ng estratehiya. Maging payak man ito, ay matalim: siya’y pupunta kay Koronel Fernando Fargas, ang gobernador político-militar, at hihingi ng mga baril at isang pangkat ng mga kawal-dagat upang palakasin ang kanyang mga cuadrillero, sa dahilang ang Kabite ay sinasabing nanganganib salakayin ng mga tulisan. Subalit ang kanyang tunay na layunin ay habatin at bihagin ang mga kawal-dagat upang makuha ang kanilang mga sandata. Bago tumungo sa daungan ng Kabite nang Lunes ng umaga, dumaan muna si Aguinaldo sa kura paroko ng bayang si Padre de Blas upang humingi ng sulat ng rekomendasyon. 

Ngunit sinabi ng pari na, bilang kapitang bayan, ay madali niyang makakamit ang kanyang kahilingan mula sa gobernador. Si Koronel Fargas ay may bisita sa kanyang tanggapan—ang brigadier heneral ng mga kawal-dagat—ngunit nang mabatid niyang ang opisyal ng Kabite ay nasa labas, ay ipinatawag niya ito sa loob. “Gobernador,” wika ni Aguinaldo na may bahid ng pagmamadali, “ang mga tulisan ay papalapit na sa aming bayan, at nabatid ko ring marami sa kanila ay nagtitipon sa mga labas-bayan ng Malibay, Pasay, at Palanyag. Dahil sa nagpipintong malubhang kalagayan, ako’y humihiling ng pangkat ng mga kawal-dagat upang tumulong sa aking mga cuadrillero.” Sa sandaling iyon, ang panauhing brigadier heneral ay nakapagsalita nang di-sinasadya, na siyang nagbunyag ng mahalagang impormasyong militar na lubos na umakma sa lihim na balak ni Aguinaldo. “Ang lahat ng kawal-dagat dito sa Kabite,” anang opisyal, “ay ipinadala na sa Maynila sa utos ni Gobernador-Heneral Blanco, na nagdeklara ng batas militar sa walong lalawigan. Isa na lamang ang natitirang kompanya dito sa arsenal.” Sapat na ang impormasyong iyon para kay Aguinaldo upang matiyak na sa pag-iral ng tamang sandali, siya at ang kanyang mga kasamang Katipunero sa Kawit ay masakop ang Casa Tribunal nang walang panganib ng agarang pagtulong mula sa kabisera ng Kabite. 

Bago umuwi sa Kawit, dumaan muna si Aguinaldo sa ilang kasamang Katipunero at inutusan silang maghanda sapagkat siya’y mag-aalsa na nang gabing iyon. Bandang ikalawa ng hapon siya’y nakarating sa Kawit. Dumiretso siya sa kumbento upang ipagbigay-alam sa kura ang kabiguang natamo sa kanyang misyong opisyal. Umuwi siya sandali at pagkatapos ay muling nagbalik sa tribunal kung saan nakita niya ang dalawa niyang konsehal: sina Candido Tirona at Santiago Dano. Ang balak ni Aguinaldo ay maghimagsik kinagabihan, datapuwa’t nang siya’y mabalitaan na ang mga Katipunero ng Magdiwang ay nagaklas na sa San Francisco de Malabon at sa Noveleta, minabuti niyang simulan agad, yamang tatlong guwardiyang sibil lamang ang nakatalaga sa Casa Tribunal. Sa panahong yaon ng kapana-panabik na kalagayan, ang makataong damdamin ni Aguinaldo ay lumitaw: “Huwag nating patayin ang mga guwardiya,” sabi niya. “Hingin lang natin ang kanilang mga baril ng mapayapa.”

 

….Ang balak ay pasukuin ang tatlong guwardiya sibil sa isang marangal na labanan. “Kaming dalawa ni kumpadre Candido ang bahala rito,” wika ng matapang na kapitang bayan. … “Makabubuting si Kuya Dano ay umuwi na sa Binakayan upang abisuhan ang ating mga tauhan roon at bantayan ang polbórin.” Si Aguinaldo, bagama’t katamtaman lamang ang taas, ay madaling natalo at nakuha ang mga sandata ng dalawang guwardiya sibil. Subalit si Candido Tirona ay nahirapan sa pakikipagbuno sa ikatlong guwardiya na mas malaki at isa pang sarhento. 

Ang mga cuadrillero, na sabik nang sumalakay, ay inutusan ni Aguinaldo na huwag makialam maliban na lamang kung kinakailangan. “Ibigay mo sa akin ang iyong baril,” mariing utos ni Aguinaldo sa matigas na sarhento, subalit hindi siya pinansin nito. Sa kanyang Alaala, ikinuwento ni Aguinaldo ang sumunod: “Kaya’t binigwasan ko siya sa sikmura at siya’y napaurong. Nabitiwan niya ang kanyang baril at sinunggaban siya ng aking mga cuadrillero na may mga punyal at itak. Ngunit pinigil ko sila at sumigaw: ‘Huwag ninyong patayin ang taong ito!’ Sa kasamaang-palad, isa sa mga cuadrillero ay hindi nakinig sa aking utos at tinaga siya sa tapat ng tainga.” Nagtamo ng malaking sugat ang guwardiya sibil, ngunit tiniyak sa kanya ni Aguinaldo na hindi siya mamamatay. “Kung hindi ko pinigil ang kamay ng cuadrillerong iyon, ay patay ka na sana ngayon din,” aniya. Agad na ipinatawag ng kapitang bayan ang isang manggagamot upang gamutin ang sugatang lalaki. (Translated from Saulo, 94)

Cavite Trenches and Fortifications

Part of a research article on how the revolution was fought that Angelo Jarin Aguinaldo did for a research journal is a section on the vital role trenches palyed during the first phase of the revolution.

Mariano Alvarez, town president of Noveleta, realizing the benefits of the trenches ordered the fortification of the town along the coast. This was in preparation for the expected retaliation of the Spanish forces under Ramon Blanco.

Kalaw (1997) also related the presence of these trenches in the victory of Binakayan:

“Noong Nobyembre 9, sinimulang sumalakay ang hanay ng mga tauhang pinamumunuan ni Heneral Rios patungong Binakayan at Noveleta…SI Koronel Marina ay sumugod sa Binakayan, mula sa Pulborista, ngunit naharangan siya ng matibay at parisukat na tambak na lupang ligid ng kanal, na may barandilya at bambang sa nasasanggahan ng mga moog sa sulukan ng dagat at ng daang patungo Imus.”

Known to have built such kind of trenches is Edilberto Evangelista, a Belgian-trained Filipino civil engineer who came to Aguinaldo’s headquarters in Zapote in November, 1896. Evangelista was later appointed general director of natural resources and assigned to take charge of the construction of trenches.

Here is what Kalaw says about the trenches that Evangelista designed:

“Ang kuta ng mga manghihimagsik sa Cavite, na itinayo sa Aromahan, Zapote at sa Cavite Viejo, ginawa sa ilalim ng pangangasiwang teknikal ni Edilberto Evangelista, na nagtapos na inihinyera sibil sa Unibersidad ng Ghent, at kararating lamang mula sa Europa. Napakahusay ng pagkakagawa ng kuta kaya’t sinabi ng isang manunulat na Espanyol na ito na raw ang kutang pandarating ng panahon na dahil sa tibay ay hindi mawawasak o malusob ng mga kawal Espanyol.”

A fortification made by Filipino forces in Noveleta (Cavite), a crucial one since the town is a few kilometers away from the Spanish arsenal.https://archive.org/details/campaadefilipi00montuoft

The Caviteños, according to Corpuz (1997), built good defense works with strong embankments and trenches. The defense works in the Dalahican (Calero)-Binakayan was a major factor in repulsing the Blanco offensive. They also built extensive trenches in Zapote (Las Piñas) since it was the jumping-off point for enemy forces coming from Manila that would attack Bacoor in northern Cavite. By January 1897, the Zapote trenches extended to eight kilometers. These trenches and fortificaiond also served as refuge to townspeople. An example of this kind was the one built by the townfolks of Cavite Viejo. The fortification as described by Aguinaldo measures 600 meters long, six meters wide, four meters high, and three meters thick.

A fortification made by Filipino forces in Noveleta (Cavite), a crucial one since the town is a few kilometers away from the Spanish arsenal.https://archive.org/details/campaadefilipi00montuoft

This northern Cavite trenches were later redesigned and improved by Edilberto Evangelista. Before Evangelista came to Aguinaldo’s headquarters, the construction of trenches in Zapote between Manila and Cavite were constructed under the direct supervision of Aguinaldo. In his memoirs, Aguinaldo cited the cooperation of Licerio Topacio, Mariano Noriel, Gil Ignacio and others.

The eastern boundaries of Cavite were likewise fortified. Aguinaldo, on November 13, 1896, ordered the construction of trenches and fortifications on Sungay mountain to the south, and along the road to Carmona on the east. The trenches were constructed in gorges and narrow passes. The fortifications were effective in delaying the advance of the Lachambre Division in February 1897 to the mentioned area (Achutegui and Bernad, 1972, p. 58).

The area near the church of Bacoor was also fortified by the Filipino revolutionary forces. Because of its proximity to Las Pinas, Bacoor was the first town to be confronted by Spanish forces coming from Manila. https://archive.org/details/campaadefilipi00montuoft

Historical accounts truly indicate that the Filipinos were indeed poorly armed. Insufficient arms and ammunition was a challenge in fighting the Spanish Army, who, with their long arms and other superior weapons, seemed invincible.

DESPICABLE MIONG PRESENTS "HOW TO KILL YOUR RIVAL" - NOT

by Tommy Matic IV

A longstanding and perniciously prevalent misconception by many Filipinos is that Aguinaldo was so jealous of Bonifacio's leadership position and, being a powerful elite, conspired to eliminate his masa rival, Bonifacio.

This hypothesis is historically inaccurate on so many levels, a pop culture myth inspired by more than a century of miseducation.

And the reasons it is nothing more than a myth are as follows:

1) Aguinaldo wasn't the jealous or grasping type. If anything he was cautious and hesitant to stand in the spotlight.

Aguinaldo repeatedly demonstrated a reluctance to grasp or hold on to top leadership positions. When the Cavite Katipuneros were talking about unifying the Magdalo and Magdiwang councils by electing a unified government, Aguinaldo preferred the more highly educated Edilberto Evangelista, the more senior and experienced Licerio Topacio, or the more politically savvy Baldomero Aguinaldo to himself to stand as the Magdalo candidate. After being elected president in absentia, he still refused to participate in the government until his elder brother Crispulo took over his duties, leading the defense of Pasong Santol, and promised to hold the line at all costs.

Later on, after returning to the Philippines and gaining absolute power, Aguinaldo attempted to beg the Filipino people to let him step down and serve as an ordinary general. Mabini was so angry at Aguinaldo's request for a special "Pamaskong aguinaldo" that he burned the pamphlets which Aguinaldo had printed.

2) Bonifacio's claim to leadership was shaky to non-existent

Bonifacio commanded immense respect among the Katipuneros and rightly so. What he - and many of his modern day adherents fail to realize - is that respect does not equivalence leadership or loyalty. While Bonifacio was respected as the man who, like Ray Kroc of MacDonalds, transformed the Katipunan decisively, his performance on the battlefield and failure to carve out a Katipunan bailiwick in Manila (compared to the successes in Bulakan with Karakon de Sili, in the northern and central Luzon regions under Llanera and of course the liberation of the entire province of Cavite under Aguinaldo and Alvarez) led many Katipuneros to leave him for the more successful revolution in Cavite. Bonifacio was in fact, in hiding in Morong, when the Alvarez clan invited him to stand as their candidate for the forthcoming elections.

3) The myth that Aguinaldo was the elite, Bonifacio was the masa.

This claim, rooted in class struggle politics has very little, if any, truth in it. Aguinaldo, like many other local leaders, was a town mayor (Alvarez and Llanera were as well) and the only circle of elites he belonged to was that of local, provincial native leaders, middle range functionaries within the Spanish colonial system. The ridiculously mistaken theory that Aguinaldo was an "elite" seems more rooted in guilt by association - Aguinaldo's first republic government infamously included Pedro Paterno, Felipe Buencamino, Benito Legarda and other elites.

Conversely, the pop culture image of Bonifacio with the camisa de chino, red trousers and kerchief, bolo and other working class visual indicators, while powerful, is highly inaccurate. Bonifacio was a local elite, just like Aguinaldo albeit one whose family had struggled through immense personal (and by extension, financial) loss and pulled themselves up by their bootstraps. Bonifacio, the unyielding fighter that he was, refused to let his parents' death drag him and his many siblings into oblivion. He tirelessly worked, gave himself an education and bettered himself so he rose out of the pit of poverty into a middle class life. That he was middle class is demonstrated by his acceptance into Philippine Freemasonry and into La Liga Filipina, gentlemen's organizations that he could not have joined had be been a mere "plebeian". Also, Oryang's family would not have even allowed him to get near her had he been lower class.

4) And the myth that Aguinaldo conspired to eliminate Bonifacio, his political rival.

The response to this is three-fold.

a) The alipores of Aguinaldo did his dirty work for him at Tejeros and at Bonifacio's trial.

Actually, the alipores of Bonifacio and Oryang's relatives, the Alvarez clan, far outnumbered and were more powerful than the alipores of Aguinaldo. If Bonifacio and Alvarez wanted to impose their will they could do so by force. Exhibit A: The Tejeros election. Biglang nag tawag nga SNAP ELECTION si Bonifacio at Alvarez while the Magdalo were busy fighting the Spaniards on the road to Imus (Anabu II, Salitran, Pasong Santol) which meant that the Magdalo could not participate in the snap elections.

As for the trial, why would Aguinaldo go through all the trouble to have a military court martial, have his alleged alipores go through the sham for a guilty verdict and then attempt to overturn it? For those assuming that it's identical to Rizal's show trial, they may want to consider the simple basic fact that Aguinaldo was not Polavieja, Aguinaldo was not a Governor General in charge of a massive colonial apparatus but to the utter contrary, Aguinaldo and all the revolutionary leaders were TRAITORS TO THE SPANISH CROWN DESERVING DEATH (the same death meted out to Gabriella Silang, Lamadrid, GOMBURZA, Francisco Roxas, Numeriano Adriano, Sancho Valenzuela and of course, Rizal himself) and had better things to do (fighting the Spaniards to save their own skins) than arranging "mock trials".

Once again I ask the Bonifascist, WHY BOTHER? Why not just put Bonifacio up against a wall and shoot him? Bonifacio himself would have done that to Aguinaldo, as he was attempting to do to Daniel Tirona at Tejeros.

Also take note Lazaro Makapagal's testimony that after he returned from executing the Bonifacio's, the town was under siege by the Spaniards.

A sham trial or kangaroo court would have been a ridiculous waste of time and resources that the Filipino revolutionaries could NOT AFFORD WHEN LACHAMBRE WAS CRUSHING THEM.

b) Bonifacio was Aguinaldo's political rival so he had to be eliminated.

This ridiculous myth of political rivalry may seem plausible if one does not consider the simple fact that Bonifacio and Aguinaldo were only political rivals for as long as the lead up to the unifying elections and the elections themselves (Tejeros) were held. Prior to and after this, there was NOTHING that Bonifacio had, politically or otherwise, that Aguinaldo had to be jealous of.

While Bonifacio was titular Supremo of the Katipunan, his reputation had been heavily tarnished by his inabilty to win battles and capture territory for the Katipunan. By December 1896 he himself admitted in a letter to his in-laws, the Alvarez clan (leaders of Sanggunian Magdiwang) that he "had not taken a single town for assembly or defense" - by that same time Cavite was already liberated from Spain, thanks largely to Aguinaldo's dynamic leadership and tactical prowess.

Also consider that the Cavite revolutionaries were discussing the creation of a new revolutionary government to supersede the Katipunan since, as Evangelista pointed out, "there are more revolutionaries fighting than were initiated into the Katipunan". The Katipunan was a great launch platform for revolution. Once launched, however, its weak internal structure which created a large confederacy of poorly cooperating councils and a very weak top-down hierarchy that even Bonifacio could not benefit from, needed to be replaced with a dedicated revolutionary government specifically created to prosecute all out war.

And then after Tejeros, having won the director of interior seat, Bonifacio was NOT any longer a political rival of Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo would rather have incorporated the erstwhile Supremo's prodigious talent for organizing and inspiring the revolutionaries into the new Revolutionary government, than exterminate him.

The reality is that Bonifacio was only a political rival so long as Bonifacio acted like one. Aguinaldo was not at Tejeros, did not vote at Tejeros, did not go around Tejeros intimidating people to vote for him - halos walang PAKIALAM si Miong sa Tejeros. Aguinaldo's primary focus was fighting the Spaniards NOT POLITICS.

After the Tejeros election, Aguinaldo sent a delegation to invite Bonifacio to participate in the new revolutionary government. Bonifacio refused. How is that Aguinaldo's fault?

After the Naik KUDETA, Aguinaldo PARDONED Noriel and Pio AND DID NOT SEND TROOPS TO CAPTURE BONIFACIO AT THAT POINT. This indicates that Aguinaldo, who had the perfect reason to arrest and execute Bonifacio AT THAT POINT, was REFUSING TO DO SO. Aguinaldo would have pardoned Bonifacio had Bonifacio returned to the fold.

c) Finally, after Bonifacio was sentenced, Aguinaldo STILL ATTEMPTED TO COMMUTE THE SENTENCE. Please explain why this repeated action of Aguinaldo, forgiving Bonifacio's excesses, does not demonstrate character and mercy on Aguinaldo's part.

What Bonifascists utterly ignore is the simple fact that Bonifacio's divisive politicking and selfish ambition DESTROYED THE CAVITE REVOLUTION. Bonifacio's own actions, constantly attempting to nullify the badly needed unity of the Revolutionaries in favor of his own selfish entitlement undermined the resistance of the Filipinos. His betrayal of the defenders of Pasong Santol which led to the Spanish breaking into Filipino lines is nothing short of treachery of the highest order. Add to that the KUDETA at Naik.

Bonifacio made himself hated and despised by the Revolutionaries who refused to elect him at Tejeros, refused to commit to his counter-government at Naik, refused to protect him at Limbon, refused to intervene at his trial, refused to rescue him from prison and refused to allow Aguinaldo to spare his life.

The real reason for Bonifacio's death was Bonifacio himself.

#TuklasPilipinas
#NoHateHistory

True Version of the Philippine Revolution by Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy

http://www.fullbooks.com/True-Version-of-the-Philippine-Revolution.html

This was obviously written to counter Otis and Merritt's reprehensible lies and propaganda, crap which "non-Leftist" American historians seem to be very willing to accept without question to this day, while holding on to their own nationalist myths.