The context of the Pact of Biak na Bato

by Tommy Matic IV

"What is it that you want, Don Pedro? That there be peace and that you be the one to bring it? After they have killed my brother Jose, ejected my family, confiscated our lands? Ah, Don Pedro, dig a deep well and fill it in with all the knives and spears in the world. Then ask me to jump into it and this Paciano Rizal will obey gladly. But never ask me for peace and the end of the Revolution, because it is impossible, absurd!"

- General Paciano Rizal upon meeting Pedro Paterno in Biak-na-Bato and refusing the handshake proffered by Paterno (thanks to Raywollesen Terco Fortes for this initial post).

It’s also important to remember the context of the Pact of Biak na Bato.

At the beginning of 1897 the Filipino Revolutionaries had liberated Cavite and put the Spaniards on the defensive. The Aguinaldo brothers were leading expeditions to Taguig and Pateros and other Katipunan branches were gaining strength and consolidating their local gains.

Of course, Spain would not just let them get away with it. Upon the outbreak of Revolution, former Governor Blanco called for reinforcements which came in the form of 15 expeditionary rifle battalions - the Cazadores. By the beginning of 1897 the new Governor General Polavieja and his field commander Lachambre were ready to go on the offensive.

With the experience of 1896 behind them, the Magdalo realized that only a single unified chain of command that encompasses all revolutionary forces would stand a chance against the better armed, better trained and better led Spanish forces which had NO DIVIDED LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS. The Katipuneros leadership was centered on the local Sanggunian (Council) and not, as so many assume, in Bonifacio’s Manila Katipunan leadership. The Katipunan simply did not have the administrative infrastructure to form a united revolutionary government. It was rather a CONFEDERACY of small local governments that did what they pleased and were not obligated to cooperate with nor support the actions of other groups and certainly failed to do so in a practical sense much of the time.

Thus the Magdalo proposed the replacement of the Katipunan by a true unified revolutionary government. Bonifacio and the ‘

Magdiwang refused, treating it as a power grab. If it was a power grab, however, it would have been a power grab by the Cavite council which had more than proven itself as a highly effective combat unit, something which NEITHER Bonifacio nor the Magdiwang could claim.

Another reason given for forming a new revolutionary government, stated by General Edilberto Evangelista, was that there were far more non-Katipuneros in their ranks than initiated Katipuneros. The revolution had outstripped the Katipunan organizational structure.

Evangelista was, by the way, the presidential candidate of choice of the young up-and-coming Magdalo general and mayor of Kawit, Emilio Aguinaldo. Evangelista was an ilustrado, highly educated and the man who arguably had the most to do with defeating former Governor General Ramon Blanco's massive Cavite offensive by constructing trenches that Spanish officers remarked were as good as European-built ones. He was, in Aguinaldo's eyes, the best man to lead a united revolutionary government.

The Magdiwang and Bonifacio refused and the debating at the Imus Convention ultimately ended without result when General Paciano Rizal arrived from Manila to report that his brother, legendary Doctor Jose Rizal, had been executed at Bagumbayan.

Thus at the beginning of 1897 the revolution still had no clear leader and no unified command structure that could organize local forces into proper divisions and corps, direct operations on a strategic scale and defend the disparate rebel strongholds against the Spanish counter-offensive that was already on the march.

Zapote Bridge, entry point to Cavite and Southern Tagalog

On Aguinaldo's Capture in Palanan, Isabela

Aguinaldo bust and marker at Palanan, Isabela,
 the terminal point of the revolution.

by Tommy Matic IV

While many Filipinos take this as an example of Miong's weakness and surrender to the Americans, they can only do this because of their ignorance of the context.

Aguinaldo never entertained the thought of surrender until he was surrounded, bound and helplessly brought aboard the enemy warship with no hope of rescue. It is true that he had made numerous attempts at conciliation - negotiating with the erstwhile American 'allies' when incidents erupted prior to Feb 1899, offering to restore peace immediately after an American soldier shot a Filipino soldier on Feb 4, 1899, and sending delegates to negotiate a peace with the American Schurmann Commission in opposition to his staunchest supporters Mabini and Luna - yet none of these peace overtures were meant to sacrifice Filipino independence. Aguinaldo made this abundantly clear in his letter to Benito Legarda, an Autonomista who had been part of the First Republic government that had gone over to the American side and was begging Aguinaldo to surrender.

Legarda wrote: "...We are in error, and yet we persist in that error... The war so far has only laid bare our insufficiency and our shortcomings...
In my judgment, giving these conditions, the time has arrived for your policy to change in a radical manner... Nothing can prevent the triumph of America.. Do not struggle against the inevitable...Peace must come some time, and the man who restores peace to the Philippines will win the admiration of the world, and the gratitude of his country. Be that man. Since 1896 you have been the soul of the people, and have merited their blessings for your wonderful and providential wisdom... be now the one to say 'Enough of conflict.'"

And Aguinaldo replied: "...In reply to this I must tell you that it is impossible for me to turn back from the enterprise which I have undertaken -that of defending our country, and especially as I have sworn that as long as life lasts I shall labor until I gain the acknowledgment of the independence of the Philippines. Do not attribute this declaration to my vanity, but to my desire to fulfill a former promise. This, aside from the fact that the struggle for the independence of our country is just and based upon our perfect rights.

We are not alarmed by the numerous arms nor the valor of our enemy. What is life to us if we are to be the slaves of the foreigner? .... I repeat, we will not give up the struggle until we gain our longed-for independence: death is of but little moment to us if we are but able to ensure the happiness of the people and of future generations.

If this is not enough to induce our enemies to desist from their endeavor, we will go, if necessary, into the mountains, but never will we accept a treaty of peace dishonorable to the Philippine arms and disastrous to the future of the country, such as that which they seek to impose."

Is that the language of a traydor? A jealous dictator? A self centered individual who cares only for personal gain?

Aguinaldo was the spirit of Filipino resistance for three bloody years. Cabezas de Barangay, town mayors, judges, farmers all refused even under torture, to betray his whereabouts to the American invaders. The bloody guerrilla resistance was dragging on, costing the Americans treasure and sapping their spirit as the war that was supposedly "mission accomplished" was proving interminable. It was determined that only the capture of Aguinaldo, the decapitation of the head of Filipino resistance could bring the war to an 'official' close.

And yet this would have been impossible had not the Americans captured a messenger from Aguinaldo asking for supplies and reinforcements from one of his officers, Urbano Lacuna. This was an intelligence coup that essentially sealed the fate of Filipino resistance against America. So long as Aguinaldo remained as head of state, the Filipinos could claim to have a nation with an extant government among the Great Powers of the World. So long as Aguinaldo remained free, Filipino freedom's light burned and flickered, lighting up the lie that America was benevolent in its assimilation.

It would take the foremost practitioner of guerrilla warfare in the United States Army, Frederick Funston, former Cuban guerrilla fighter and current commander of the hell-roaring 20th Kansas Volunteers to plan and execute one of the most daring 'commando' raids of all time, trusting a turncoat gang of ex-Spanish loyalists turned American 'Scouts' to portray a company of Filipino revolutionary troops, under the command of ex-Spanish officers (who might have still had some hard feelings against the Americans that defeated them) while he and his picked squad of American officers would be bound up as prisoners, helpless in the hands of Filipinos and Spanish that were supposedly on their side. And of course they had to actually find Aguinaldo first.

Find him they did, on the day after the Filipino president's birthday. This was an extremely fortuitous coincidence for Funston as it meant that Aguinaldo and the rest of his much reduced presidential coterie and guards were off their guard, relaxed and unready after a day of feasting and celebrating. When the moment came and Funston commanded the Macabebe Scouts to open fire, they scattered Aguinaldo's guard platoon directly opposite them with a resounding volley, killing several of the Revolutionary guardsmen. Aguinaldo, like the hapless Antonio Luna three years previously, heard the sound of gunfire and rushed to investigate - but the turncoat Spanish officers pinioned Aguinaldo, rendering him helpless. Their orders were to take the Filipino president alive, if possible.

As he was hustled away, poor Emilio Aguinaldo wondered aloud, "Is this not some sort of joke?"

With his capture, the hopes of an extended Filipino resistance were quickly crushed - even as he was being taken, Filipino officers were surrendering to the Americans as a weary Filipino civilian population were slowly assimilated into the American military government. The dauntless Batanguenos under Miguel Malvar were eventually reconcentrated into fortified camps guarded by American Krags and Springfields, separating Malvar's guerrillas from their civilian support. Malvar in Batangas and Simeon Ola in Southern Tagalog region were the last two 'official' Filipino generals to surrender.

Palanan was the last stand of the Filipino First Republic, the last hope for independence in the Philippine Revolutionary period. It would be more than 40 years before America recognized the independence that Aguinaldo and the Filipino people had fought for, a recognition that would never have happened without the indomitable courage and devotion to duty that Aguinaldo held to until the moment he was forced to yield at Palanan.

#aguinaldo #emilioaguinaldo

The Bonifacio Tragedy in Context

By Tommy Matic IV and Basilio Ibabawan

The things to remember about the Bonifacio arrest/trial/execution are:

1) It never would have happened if Bonifacio had never come to Cavite. In a communication with Santiago Alvarez, Bonifacio said that he "will not remain long in Cavite but would return and harass the enemy from other fronts" and would "not meddle in local politics". He kept neither promise.

2) Magdalo and Magdiwang were both local Caviteño Katipunan Councils (Sanggunian) and were not "factions" much less not "national pro Bonifacio and anti Bonifacio parties". The Magdiwang was led by the Alvarez clan and were never "Bonifacio's faction" - to the contrary, the Alvarez's hoped to use Bonifacio as their pansabong against Aguinaldo. The fact that BOTH Councils decided to unite and form a new Revolutionary Government outside the Katipunan shows that they were more independent-minded and if this constituted "a betrayal of Bonifacio/the Katipunan" then it was not just the Aguinaldo's and their followers that were complicit.

3) A big mistake in the Filipino historical educational system and in thinking of the Bonifacio execution in general is divorcing the event from a) it's motivations and b) it's historical context. Things do not happen in a vacuum but rather are the result of reactions to other actions. Bonifacio's behavior in Cavite went from annoying (alienating the Magdalo who had previous had no quarrel with him, and threatening the unity of the Cavite Revolutionaries), to immature (his actions at the Tejeros Convention, including violent threats and a refusal to abide by his own oath which he, as President of the Convention, had made everyone swear), to seditious (forming a counter revolutionary government at Naik and attempting to to steal the loyalty of two Magdalo generals), to openly counter revolutionary (assaulting a Magdiwang town, Indang, that had refused to provision him). After this, AguiNaldo ordered the arrest of the Bonifacios.


4) Bonifacio's arrest was carried out by troops that were, like all the rest of the Katipunan forces were, tribal/warlord type armies in nature, meaning that their loyalty was mainly and primarily to their direct commander. Loyalty was via patronage, social and personal debt, charisma and maintained via threats, charisma and displays of strength plus most important, battlefield victory. This was not a highly evolved military organization like the modern Philippine military, but rather more like the Game of Thrones feudal armies or a Mafia godfather's gangsters. As such, Aguinaldo had almost no control over the arresting troops and officers unless he had directly supervised them, which he didn't. And there could no "command responsibility" because of the warlord nature of the forces. So while Col.Agapito "Yntong" Bonzon by all accounts behaved deplorably, this cannot be blamed on Aguinaldo.

5) The Arrest, Consejo de Guerra, and Execution were agreed upon by the United Revolutionary Government of both Magdalo and Magdiwang. Both Magdalo and Magdiwang members sat on and agreed upon the verdict of the Consejo de Guerra. Magdiwang never lifted a finger to rescue Bonifacio. The great irony is that the one person who wanted to save Bonifacio's life was Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo, as president could have opposed Noriel and P. Del Pilar but it would have been extremely risky, given the warlord nature of the Revolution armies.

Testimony of Pedro Giron given during Bonifacio's trial

Many historians dismissed the testimony of Pedro Giron during the trial of Andres Bonifacio because they claim it was made under duress or he was pressured or bribed to lie in an effort by the followers of Aguinaldo to put down Andres Bonifacio. But in the light of the “Acta de Tejeros” or Bonifacio's election protest with his demand for all elected officials to vacate their posts and the failed coup d'etat he initiated as documented in "Acta de Naic" or the “Naik Military Agreement”, where it was revealed Bonifacio wanted Aguinaldo killed, two events that these historians similarly pushed aside and ignore, Giron's testimony apparently jibes with the events and therefore deserves a second look. This damaging testimony confirmed the plans of Bonifacio to regain power and assassinate Aguinaldo. Here is the full text of Pedro Giron's testimony lifted from Taylor's PIR, 1:315-316)

“At the barracks of Naic, on this thirtieth day of April of the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety-seven, before the investigating Judge appeared Pedro Giron, unmarried, twenty-seven years old, born in the pueblo of Baliwag, Bulacan, and upon being duly sworn testified as follows:

Q. Do you know that there is a Government ruling over this territory supported by an army? - A. Yes, I do.

Q. Does Andres Bonifacio hold any office within the gift of this Government, and, as such authorized to recruit and keep troops under this command? - A. I do not know that he had any office or authority at all.

Q. What was the number of men and rifles at Andres Bonifacio's disposal? - A. I was in the capacity of a soldier of Andres Bonifacio and cannot tell anything about the number of his men and rifles. I was reluctant in joining him, for I knew that, since the meeting which took place in the town of Tansa for the election of a President and other high officials of the Government, he was entertaining intentions which were not at all favorable to it. One day, the date of which I do not recollect, Andres Bonifacio came to me and said: “let us go away from this place, you had all better come with me, for something unpleasant may happen to him [Aguinaldo] and his followers; simply because he started this revolutionary movement he believes himself to be entitled to hold the leadership of the same.” After some twenty days, more or less, when all the forces from Tansa had already come over to this place, Andres Bonifacio sent for me, and when I arrived to his house, he said to me: “we shall stay here; in spite of Captain Emilio the leadership of this movement belongs to me; I must outrank him or will have him killed.” On that same day he gave me ten pesos in order that I would carry out his wishes of killing Aguinaldo, in case that the latter should not yield to him the leadership of the insurrection, begging me not to disappoint him as he would liberally reward me for my deed. As things were, I thought that something wrong would happen and without the loss of a moment I left him [Bonifacio] and went to Buenavista, within the jurisdiction of Malabon [San Francisco de Malabon] with a party of infantry soldiers from the towns of Silang, Perez Dasmarinas, Malabon, and Tansa. I knew that Andres Bonifacio was recruiting men to resist the troops that were going to be sent by this Government, and I knew also that he had planned to overthrow Aguinaldo's authority, which he said belonged to him; his own soldiers can testify as to the truth of my assertion; I advised him to abandon his position, to which he objected, for, he said, he did not want the people to think that he was afraid of those who were in power.

Q. Were Andres Bonifacio's brothers all acquainted with everything the former was planning? - A. I believe not.

Q. Were there any meetings held at the house of Andres Bonifacio at Limbong, and, if so, who attended, and what was discussed? - A. I knew that they were frequently holding meetings at their house, but as I am a stranger I cannot tell who those attending were or what was discussed in them.

Q. Where did the food of Andres Bonifacio's men came from, and who gave it to them? - A. I cannot tell anything about that.

Q. Have you any further statement to make besides what you have said above? - A. Early on Tuesday morning I was in Limbong when the firing of rifles between Bonifacio brothers and the troops of this Government started. I tried to use my best efforts to quiet them down to no avail, as Ciriaco at the moment emptied his weapon, the bullets of which cause the death of two soldiers of this Government; I shouted that we being born in the same country should not fight each other, but no one would listen to me.

Upon having read the foregoing testimony the witness ratified it by signing his name, to which I, the Secretary, attest with my signature.”

(Signed by: Pedro Giron, Lazaro Makapagal and Pantaleon Garcia)